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The Tyranny of Plastics:  
How Society of Plastics, Inc. v. County of 
Suffolk Prevents New Yorkers from 
Protecting Their Environment and How They 
Could Be Liberated from Its Unreasonable 
Standing Requirements 
ALBERT K. BUTZEL & NED THIMMAYYA* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Court of Appeals of New York issued its 
holding in the landmark case Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. 
County of Suffolk, citizen oversight of government-approved and 
government projects with environmental implications has 
suffered curtailment inconsistent with the objectives of the State 
 
* Albert K. Butzel is the principal of Albert K. Butzel Law Offices in New 
York City. He has litigated a number of standing cases in both Federal and 
State courts, including the seminal case of Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), and most 
recently, under New York law, Allison v. New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Commission, 944 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
Ned Thimmayya is of counsel at Albert K. Butzel Law Offices. Thimmayya's 
environmental law blog can be found at www.courtscatscarbon.com. 
The authors would like to thank Michael Gerrard and Michael Gruen for 
their comments on drafts of this article. 
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Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). At the center of the 
conflict between SEQRA and citizen enforcement are the 
restrictive standing requirements formulated by Society of 
Plastics, which include the demand that a petitioner demonstrate 
harm distinct from injury to the general public. Not only does 
such a prerequisite for consideration of a case’s merits ignore the 
interrelatedness of local environmental conditions with larger 
regional trends, but also insulates from judicial review 
widespread environmental damages that injure the public. 
Beyond New York, numerous other states have developed 
standing doctrines that more capably match the purposes of their 
environmental protection acts and address the ecological 
complexities of environmental harms yet also prevent frivolous 
complaints from disrupting judicial efficiency. New York State, 
through the example set by other jurisdictions and through 
recognizing the unreasonable outcomes of post-Society of Plastics 
cases is well situated to reform its environmental standing 
doctrine through judicial action or legislation. This article will 
first outline the current status of citizen standing to enforce 
SEQRA in Part II; then III) highlight the manner in which New 
York’s standing doctrine has diverged from SEQRA’s goals; IV) 
examine more effective environmental standing doctrines in other 
states; V) suggest precedent New York courts could utilize to 
correct New York’s defective standing requirements; and, finally, 
VI) offer a legislative solution to the deficiency of the standing 
requirements engendered by Society of Plastics. 
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF CITIZEN STANDING 
IN NEW YORK STATE 
SEQRA is the primary New York State law used for 
monitoring government-permitted and government projects that 
could have a substantial impact on the environment.1  Article 78 
of the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (NYCPLR) 
 
 1. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (McKinney 2013); see generally J. 
Andrew Williams, Society of Plastics Industry v. County of Suffolk: New Barriers 
to SEQRA Standing in New York, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 152, 154-58 (1993) 
(summarizing SEQRA-mandated processes, including preparation of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS)). 
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provides a mechanism to challenge a government agency’s 
compliance with SEQRA.2  However, an individual or group 
qualifies to bring suit only if it has “standing”: a legal interest in 
the subject matter of the action that is recognized by the courts.3  
The current standing test for petitioners initiating Article 78 
proceedings to compel compliance with SEQRA was set forth in 
Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of Suffolk.4  In order to 
establish Article 78 standing, an individual petitioner must show 
that he or she 1) suffers actual injury (so-called “injury-in-fact” as 
a result of the action he or she complains of); 2) the injury must 
be distinct from the impact on the public as a whole; and 3) the 
injury must fall within the zone of interests protected by 
SEQRA.5  In the “area of associational or organizational 
standing” to challenge actions under SEQRA, Society of Plastics 
held that one or more members of the organization must have 
standing to sue (“standing cannot be achieved by merely 
multiplying the persons a group purports to represent”);6 the 
organization must show that the interests it purports to 
represent are “germane to its purposes so as to satisfy the court 
that it is an appropriate representative of those interests;” 7 and 
finally that “neither the asserted claim nor the appropriate relief 
requires the participation of the individual members.”8 
Recently, Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of 
Albany altered the manner in which the above standing tests are 
applied to a suit, at least with respect to organizational standing. 
While many post-Society of Plastics courts suggested that injury 
 
 2. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 78 (McKinney 2011). 
 3. See Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 
1038 (N.Y. 1991). 
 4. See id. at 1039-42. Of forty-four SEQRA cases heard by the Court of 
Appeals, only six have been split decisions, one of which was Society of Plastics. 
Michael B. Gerrard, Standing Under SEQRA: 'Progeny of Society of Plastics 
Industry,' N.Y. L.J, Nov. 22, 2002, at 3. 
 5. See Soc’y of Plastics, 573 N.E.2d at 1041. 
 6. Id. at 1042. 
 7. Id. at 1041 (“[T]he requirement that a petitioner's injury fall within the 
concerns the Legislature sought to advance or protect by the statute assures 
that groups whose interests are only marginally related to, or even inconsistent 
with, the purposes of the statute cannot use the courts to further their own 
purposes at the expense of the statutory purposes.”). 
 8. Id. at 1042. 
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distinct from the public depends on a petitioner’s close proximity 
to a permitted project,9 Save the Pine Bush declared that a 
petitioner’s proximity is not essential to establish the special 
harm prong of the standing test, and that regular use of a 
resource for recreation or similar activity may be sufficient.10 
III. PROBLEMS WITH STANDING UNDER SEQRA 
The purposes of SEQRA,11 as stated in the statute, do not 
suggest or impose any limits on who should be able to challenge 
 
 9. Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1238 (N.Y. 
1996). See also Saratoga Lake Prot. & Imp. Dist. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works of 
Saratoga Springs, 846 N.Y.S.2d 786, 791 (App. Div. 2007); Comm. to Pres. 
Brighton Beach & Manhattan Beach, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of N.Y., 695 
N.Y.S.2d 7, 12 (App. Div. 1999). 
 10. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of Albany, 918 N.E.2d 917, 
921 (N.Y. 2009) (“However Society of Plastics does not hold or suggest, that 
residence close to a challenged project is an indispensible element of standing in 
every environmental case.”); see also Mary A. Chertok & Ashley S. Miller, 
Environmental Law: Developments in the Law of SEQRA, 2009, 60 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 925, 930 (2010) (explaining how Save the Pine Bush diverged from post-
Society of Plastics courts' proximity emphasis). A petitioner able to show close 
proximity may nevertheless be able to fulfill the special harm prong without a 
further showing of distinct injury. Gernatt Asphalt Prods., 664 N.E.2d at 1238 
(“A nearby property owner may have standing to challenge a proposed zoning 
change because aggrievement may be inferred from proximity.” (citing Sun-Brite 
Car Wash v. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 508 N.E.2d 130, 131 (1987))). Where the 
subject of a SEQRA challenge is not a zoning change adjacent to or 
encompassing property belonging to the petitioner, however, close proximity 
may be insufficient in and of itself to establish standing. Rather proximity may 
only be sufficient to the extent the injury-inducing project is visible from the 
vantage point of the plaintiff's property. See Matt Dulak, What's It To You? 
Citizen Challenges to Landmark Preservation Decisions and the Special Damage 
Requirement, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 447 (2013) (challenging the special harm rule 
in the context of landmark preservation cases). 
 11. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013). The purpose of 
SEQRA is: 
to declare a state policy which will encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment 
and enhance human and community resources; and to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems, natural, human and 
community resources important to the people of the state. 
Id. See also Joan Leary Matthews, Unlocking the Courthouse Doors: Removal of 
the “Special Harm” Requirement Under SEQRA, 65 ALB. L. REV. 421, 457 (2001) 
(“SEQRA—with its broad definition of environment, low threshold for requiring 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/1
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government findings that violate the statute. In fact, the 
limitations are court derived. The current Society of Plastics test, 
even as refined by Save the Pine Bush, has led to inconsistent 
results for standing determinations and therefore hinders the 
effectiveness of SEQRA.12  In fact, New York’s standing test 
under SEQRA “has no parallel in either federal standing law or 
the laws of most other states, and thus makes New York one of 
the most restrictive jurisdictions for environmental plaintiffs.”13 
In contrast to the preoccupation with special harm fermented 
by case law,14 the purposes of SEQRA are general and oriented 
towards public interest. The Act speaks to protecting the 
 
the preparation of an environmental impact statement, and its action-forcing 
measures—held enormous promise when it was first enacted.”). 
 12. See Philip Weinberg, SEQRA: Effective Weapon – If Used as Directed, 65 
ALB. L. REV. 315 (2001). 
SEQRA is, in the end, only as effective as New York’s courts will 
allow it to be. A string of early court rulings soon after SEQRA’s 
enactment ensured its vitality by enjoining projects and vacating 
permits where agencies had ignored SEQRA by failing to write EISs 
or to consider alternatives or mitigation measures. However, . . . 
[Society of Plastics] unduly limited the ability of citizens to obtain 
legal standing in court to question agencies’ compliance with 
SEQRA. 
Id. at 320. See generally Matthews, supra note 11, at 422-23 (comparing SEQRA 
with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the federal equivalent of 
SEQRA, positing that SEQRA’s standing requirements are far more “stringent 
and preclusive” and describing the ensuing harm caused by these requirements). 
 13. Michael B. Gerrard, Judicial Review Under SEQRA: A Statistical Study, 
65 ALB. L. REV. 365, 372 (2001). See also id. at 379 (“The essence of the holding 
of the nearly 2000 SEQRA decisions can be boiled down to one sentence:  If an 
agency identifies the relevant areas of concern, writes them up in moderate 
detail, takes action consistent with the write-up, and follows the procedures 
reasonably closely, the agency is highly likely to eventually win any SEQRA 
lawsuit brought against it.”). 
 14. Historically, the special harm requirement, or the "different-in-kind" test, 
is actually a distortion of the older "difference-in-degree" test whereby courts 
determined standing based on the severity of an injury rather than the more 
restrictive criterion demanding that a petitioner suffer a unique injury. See 
generally Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing the Public Nuisance: Solving the 
Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755 (2001). The special 
harm requirement later emerged in England during the Industrial Revolution 
when Parliament sought to insulate railroad companies from duplicitous suits. 
These "railroad cases" were based on Parliament's acts rather than common law. 
See id. (describing the origins of the special harm rule, and how, specifically in 
the context of public nuisance actions, it has hindered legal actions beneficial to 
the public). 
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environment generally.15  The purposes of the Act emphasize the 
broad public environmental concerns of the state, thus suggesting 
that environmental threats across the state are interrelated and 
that environmental well-being is a concern of the “people of the 
state.”16  Section 8-103(2) of SEQRA more specifically reveals the 
incompatibility of SEQRA and a special harm requirement, 
declaring that “[e]very citizen has a responsibility to contribute to 
the preservation and enhancement of the quality of the 
environment.”17 
The special harm requirement laid down in Society of Plastics 
has clearly prevented injured plaintiffs from seeking redress 
under SEQRA. In Long Island Pine Barrens Society, Inc. v. 
Planning Board of Town of Brookhaven, plaintiffs sought to 
demonstrate that a construction project would negatively affect 
the ground water in an area that had been designated as a 
protected ground water area.18  The protected ground water area 
consisted of the “sole source aquifer” for many Long Island 
residents, and yet such residents did not have standing to sue 
because “so many” would suffer a similar harm, and thus they 
were unable to allege special harm.19  Long Island Pine Barrens 
demonstrates an ironic impact of the Society of Plastics test: 
projects entailing the most widespread environmental harm are 
often unchallengeable because there will be “too many” affected 
members of the public to achieve standing.20 
 
 15. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013) (SEQRA’s general 
purpose is to “encourage . . . harmony between man and his environment,” 
“prevent or eliminate damage to the environment,” and “to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems, natural, human and community 
resources important to the people of the state”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. § 8-0103(2). 
 18. Long Island Pine Barrens Soc’y, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Brookhaven, 623 
N.Y.S.2d 613 (App. Div. 1995). 
 19. Matthews, supra note 11, at 456. 
 20. See Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in 
Environmental Suits and the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 27, 49 (2003) 
(describing how dissenting judges in Society of Plastics warned that the 
majority's holding “effectively barred challenging environmental injury suffered 
by all area residents, unless the plaintiff can show injury unique to itself”). The 
United States Supreme Court has highlighted the dangerous impact of a special 
harm requirement where environmental damage is concerned: “[t]o deny 
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/1
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The special harm requirement has prevented environmental 
organizations from protecting the very interests for which they 
were established and pursuing the missions for which they are 
maintained. In Otsego 2000, Inc. v. Planning Board of Town of 
Oswego, the court held a non-profit entity “organized for 
charitable purposes which include the preservation and 
promotion of the natural beauty, wholesome environment and 
varied economic landscape of the Otsego Lake region” did not 
have standing to “obtain judicial review of administrative 
actions.”21  The court held that Otsego 2000 (the non-profit 
plaintiff) failed to allege injury distinct from that of the general 
 
injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government 
actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.”  
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 
669, 688 (1973). Furthermore, The grievously debilitating effect of the special 
harm requirement was not lost upon the dissent in Society of Plastics: 
Under the new standard, someone who alleges environmental 
damage from an action which applies generally to an entire area and 
indiscriminately affects everyone in the area is precluded from 
judicial review. Because such environmental damage is by its very 
nature undifferentiated and shared by all, the objector cannot show 
special damage that is different from that of the public at large. The 
rule, as it is employed here, can thus present a virtual impasse to 
judicial review. 
The majority's imposition of this extra standing requirement marks 
a decided change in the course of the Court's carefully developed 
jurisprudence in interpreting and implementing SEQRA since its 
enactment 15 years ago. It denotes an apparent lessening in what 
has been recognized as this Court's “powerful commitment to the 
goal of SEQRA.”  As I believe will be demonstrated, the majority's 
rationale for it does not withstand critical analysis. Moreover, 
because it can operate to shield cases of clearly insufficient SEQRA 
compliance from judicial review-as it does here-the new “special 
damage” rule does not serve the public interest or further the 
important policies embraced by the Legislature in its enactment of 
SEQRA. 
Finally, the majority's decision to erect this additional barrier to 
standing is at odds with the more open-handed approach to standing 
assumed by New York courts in recent years and our recognition 
that the “fundamental tenet of our system of remedies is that when a 
government agency seeks to act in a manner adversely affecting a 
party, judicial review of that action may be had. 
Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1049 (N.Y. 
1991) (Hancock Jr., J., dissenting). 
 21. Otsego 2000, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Oswego, 575 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585-87 
(App. Div. 1991). 
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public.22  Furthermore, the court discussed Otsego 2000’s 
membership qualifications, which, the court noted, did not 
include a membership fee or formal application process.23  
Therefore, the court questioned whether the organization actually 
represented those individuals listed on its membership list.24 
Otsego 2000 illustrates the formidable standing barriers 
facing non-profit environmental organizations seeking to compel 
review of administrative decisions under SEQRA. The 
implications for indigent citizens seem particularly harsh since 
the court suggested that the free and simple membership 
enrollment process of Otsego 2000 weighed against its standing to 
sue. Since the court also noted none of Otsego 2000’s members 
owned property abutting the project site,25 the decision highlights 
the increased subordination of the public’s environmental 
concerns beneath the individual property owner’s. Environmental 
organizations seeking to contest environmentally destructive 
decisions, according to the Otsego 2000 court, cannot contest 
administrative actions that are inherently damaging to the 
broader environment. Instead, the decision suggests that 
environmental harms must be attached to a petitioner’s private 
interests through ownership of adjacent property or special 
harm.26  As discussed above and in conflict with Otsego 2000’s 
outcome, SEQRA is intended to protect the environmental 
concerns of the “people of the state,” not individuals experiencing 
harm different from the “people of the state.”27  Additionally, if 
environmental organizations possessing the financial resources to 
contest an administrative decision are prevented from doing so, 
there may be no financially viable plaintiff who is able to survive 
the standing test.28  Of course such limitations are especially 
 
 22. Id. at 586. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013). 
 28. See Williams, supra note 1, at 171 (“Another concern is the inability of a 
directly affected local plaintiff to gather the resources necessary to make a 
SEQRA challenge. While a well-financed organizational plaintiff may be shut 
out because of the need to show direct harm, the local plaintiff who can show 
direct harm may not have the financial means to engage in litigation.”).  
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/1
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prohibitive for poor communities seeking to maintain healthy 
environments in the face of government-approved development 
plans.29 
In some cases governed by the Society of Plastics’ standing 
test, even owners of property abutting impacted land or water 
cannot convince a court to consider the merits of their claims. In 
Schulz v. Warren County Board of Supervisors, the owners of 
property on Lake George challenged the Warren County Board of 
Supervisors’ acceptance of a Final EIS regarding a sewage system 
proposed for a town also located on Lake George.30  Rather than 
recognize that sewage projects undertaken by a town on the lake 
might impact the lake’s water and therefore waterside properties 
beyond the town’s boundaries, the court refused to examine the 
petitioners’ allegations of “increased runoff pollution” and 
“degradation of the quality of the waters of Lake George, which 
the petitioners allegedly use for drinking, boating, fishing and 
swimming.”31  The court’s reasoning rested on its determination 
that “the lake is a public body of water and [petitioners’] 
allegations are merely generalized claims of harm no different in 
kind or degree from the public at large.”32  Ownership of property 
on the lake seemed to carry no persuasive weight in Schulz 
despite the Otsego 2000 court’s insinuations that property 
ownership could tilt the balance in favor of petitioners.33 
Society of Plastics, as clarified by Pine Bush, has stifled 
concerned citizens in cases far more recent than Schulz. In 
 
 29. As an epilogue to discussion of Otsego 2000, the reader should note that 
the court did not provide the petitioner leave to amend its complaint, in contrast 
to the US Supreme Court’s position in Sierra Club v. Morton. Otsego 2000, 575 
N.Y.S.2d at 586-87; but see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (U.S.1972). 
Though the opinion indicates the decision did not “insulate the government from 
judicial review,” no judicial review of the administrative process in Otsego 2000 
has since taken place. Otsego 2000, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87. 
 30. See Schulz v. Warren Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 614 N.Y.S.2d 809-10 (App. 
Div. 1994). 
 31. Id. at 811. 
 32. Id. 
 33. In Bolton v. Town of Bristol Planning Board, the court echoed Schulz by 
holding that a petitioner owning property on a lake targeted for development 
cannot establish special harm by virtue of owning property on the impacted 
lake. Bolton v. Town of Bristol Planning Bd., 832 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (App. Div. 
2007). 
9
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Saratoga Lake Protection and Improvement District v. 
Department of Public Works of Saratoga Springs, the court 
determined that the Town of Saratoga and the Town of Stillwater 
lacked standing to challenge the Department of Public Works’ 
SEQRA findings.34  Both towns alleged that “loss of opportunities 
for lake recreation,” “continued suburbanization,” and “loss of 
wetlands,” among other injuries, would result from a 
development plan to draw potable water from Saratoga Lake.35  
The court found that the town’s “generalized claims of harm have 
failed to identify any specific, direct environmental harm to the 
Towns’ personal or property rights, either personally or in a 
representative capacity, that differs from that of the public at 
large,” and thus failed to fulfill the Society of Plastics special 
harm prong.36  The public, as represented by its municipal 
government, was refused justice before consideration of the 
merits. Harm to the Town’s personal or property rights should 
not have been at issue considering the broad scope of SEQRA and 
its focus on the environmental well-being of the “people of the 
state.”37 
In East End Property Co., LLC v. Town Board of Brookhaven, 
petitioners were denied standing in what was a prototypical case 
of industrial ruination perpetrated upon a helpless community.38  
The petitioners alleged that the Town Board of Brookhaven had 
made an “arbitrary and capricious” decision in approving 
construction of a power plant (the Caithness Project) after it had 
previously refused such approval.39  The plaintiffs alleged in their 
appellate brief that: 
[a]s the record below conclusively established, barely weeks after 
rejecting SEQRA Findings necessary to approve the Special 
Permit and zoning variances and waivers on June 6, 2006, the 
Town Board members held a “re-vote” on July 25, 2006 to 
 
 34. See Saratoga Lake Prot. & Improvement Dist. v. Dep't of Pub. Works of 
Saratoga Springs, 846 N.Y.S.2d 786, 791-92 (App. Div. 2010). 
 35. Id. at 792. 
 36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013). 
 38. See E. End Prop. Co. v. Town Bd. of Brookhaven, 868 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. 
Div. 2008). 
 39. Id. at 267. 
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approve SEQRA certification, upon the same environmental 
record, and without any intervening change in the environmental 
character or impacts of the Caithness Plant (other than an 
intervening increase in the amount paid by the applicant and 
LIPA via the “Community Benefits Package”).40 
Nevertheless the court determined that the petitioners, 
which included civic associations, the owners of a nearby housing 
complex, and individual residents, did not have standing to enjoin 
the special permit, variance, and waiver granted by the Town to 
facilitate the Caithness Project because the petitioners did not 
sufficiently allege “injury which is in some way different from 
that of the public at large.”41  The court came to this conclusion 
despite the power plant’s 170 foot-high exhaust stack (“more than 
fifty feet” over the zoning ordinance’s permitted height), an 
eighty-foot high building (thirty feet above the permitted height), 
and the building’s “[fifteen]-acre ‘footprint.’ “42  The petitioners 
also alleged that the environmental review overseen by the Long 
Island Power Authority did not even include a new twenty-two 
mile gas pipeline that would be necessary for the operation of the 
power plant.43  Finally, the petitioners indicated “the Project 
[would] have an adverse impact on land use, flora, fauna, 
terrestrial ecology, noise, traffic, air quality, water quality and 
quantity, human health, aesthetics, community and neighborhood 
character and property values, causing environmental and 
economic harm to Petitioners and the residents of Atlantic 
 
 40. Brief for Petitioners-Plaintiffs/Respondents-Cross-Appellants at 3-4, E. 
End Prop. Co., 868 N.Y.S.2d 264 (No. 2007-05041), 2008 WL 5599985, at *4-5. It 
is worth noting that the Town Board’s reversal of its decision coincided with the 
power plant operator and Long Island Power Authority’s intervening donation of 
$151 million dollars to the town (“The Community Benefits Package”). The 
petitioners claimed the Board’s approval was expressly conditioned on receipt of 
this donation. Such conditioning resulted in “unlawful and impermissible 
‘contract zoning.’”  See Combined Verified Petition and Complaint, E. End 
Property Co., 868 N.Y.S.2d 264 (No. 2006-29696), 2006 WL 6201544. 
 41. E. End Prop. Co., 868 N.Y.S.2d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
 42. See Combined Verified Petition and Complaint, supra note 40. 
 43. See id. 
11
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Point,”44 all clearly falling under the umbrella of SEQRA 
protections.45 
As recently as 2012, in Matter of Finger Lakes Zero Waste 
Coalition, Inc. v. Martens, the Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coalition 
(“the Coalition”), an organization specifically organized to reduce 
waste production and promote healthy air and water quality in 
the Finger Lakes region, filed a complaint that was dismissed 
because the Coalition failed to allege that one of its members 
suffered “direct harm, injury that is in some way different from 
that of the public at large.”46  Society of Plastics’ familiar mantra 
trumped the organization’s interests in contesting the New York 
State Department of Environmental Conservation’s 
environmental assessment of a landfill permit modification. 
Although one of the organization’s members lived within 4,000 
feet of the landfill, alleged that she suffered increased noise and 
dust from operations permitted by the modification, and was part 
of a “property protection plan” designed to compensate property 
owners for depreciation of property values due to the landfill, she 
was still unable to establish standing because she did not “use 
and enjoy” the “soil borrow” from which the County was 
excavating the landfill sand.47 
As the cases prove, the Society of Plastics standing test has 
hampered proper application of SEQRA. SEQRA seeks to protect 
the environment for the benefit of the general public. To impose 
the current harsh restrictions on plaintiffs, particularly the 
special harm requirement, is akin to “privatizing” the statute, the 
effect of which will be to allow only monied individuals, some 
parties within a few hundred feet of permitted projects, and 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105 (McKinney 2013) (“6. 
‘Environment’ means the physical conditions which will be affected by a 
proposed action, including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects 
of historic or aesthetic significance, existing patterns of population 
concentration, distribution, or growth, and existing community or neighborhood 
character.”). 
 46. Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coal., Inc. v. Martens, 944 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 
(App. Div. 2012) (quoting Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 
N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (N.Y. 1991)  (internal quotation marks omitted), appeal 
denied,  976 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2012). 
 47. Id. at 338-39. 
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parties alleging localized environmental threats, to be heard in 
court. 
These adverse consequences are not mere speculation. After 
Society of Plastics in 1991, up until 2002, only 48% of SEQRA 
cases where standing was challenged were permitted to go 
forward in contrast to 68% of suits before Society of Plastics.48  
The legal recourse of community groups, environmental groups, 
and “neighbors of challenged projects” was particularly damaged 
by Society of Plastics.49  Neighbors’ rate of prevailing in standing 
challenges decreased from 85% before Society of Plastics to 50% 
after it.50  Community groups and environmental organizations’ 
success rate fell from 67% to 33%.51  Business entities, on the 
other hand, were only marginally hindered as indicated by their 
comparatively modest decrease in surviving standing challenges 
from 50% to 45%.52 
Current judicial holdings are effectively in derogation of the 
purposes of SEQRA, but they are not without cure. Numerous 
other states have addressed this defect by adopting citizen suit 
provisions to enforce their environmental statutes. We believe 
New York should follow suit. 
IV. OTHER STATES’ SOLUTIONS 
Many states offer a range of alternatives to New York’s 
current standing requirements. The jurisdictions discussed below 
all maintain standing qualifications more appropriate to the 
needs of enforcing their environmental statutes than New York 
currently provides to its citizens. The states illustrating more 
effective standing law may be grouped into three camps. 
Historically, Michigan leads the states of the most relaxed 
 
 48. Gerrard, supra note 4, at 3, 5. Gerrard analyzed all cases concerning 
standing under SEQRA considered by the New York State Appellate Division 
and the Court of Appeals from 1975 (SEQRA's enactment) to 2002, which 
included a total of 101 cases. Id. at 3. 
 49. See id. at 5. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. Prior to Society of Plastics, most dismissals for lack of standing where 
businesses were the petitioners are attributed to the economic nature of the 
petitioners’ injuries, which do not fall within the purview of SEQRA. Id. at 3. 
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persuasion, including Minnesota, Connecticut, and New Jersey. 
Hawai’i and Illinois are not far behind. Of the states selected for 
comparison, Florida and California contain the least liberal 
standing hurdles, but these are still less inimical to public 
environmental interests than New York’s standing demands. 
Michigan 
Michigan was the first state to pass a statutory 
environmental citizen suit.53 An examination of the Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act’s (MEPA’s) impact demonstrates 
that citizen suits sharpen a legislative act’s ability to protect the 
environment, and that courts do not become flooded by frivolous 
or solely economically-concerned plaintiffs as a result of relaxed 
standing requirements. 
Within the first three years of the statute’s existence—MEPA 
was enacted in 1970—seventy-four suits were initiated.54  
Unexpectedly, many of these suits were initiated by state 
agencies rather than private parties, suggesting that eased 
standing requirements do not necessarily invite a slew of self-
 
 53. See Joseph L. Sax & Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Citizen Standing 
Suits: Three Years Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection 
Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1 (1974) (“The Michigan Environmental Protection Act 
was the first statute to provide for citizen suits to protect the environment from 
degradation by either public or private entities and to provide a broad scope for 
court adjudication.”). The relevant portion of the Michigan statute provides that: 
(1) The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in 
the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation 
occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief 
against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other 
natural resources and the public trust in these resources from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (1), if there is a 
standard for pollution or for an antipollution device or procedure, 
fixed by rule or otherwise, by the state or an instrumentality, 
agency, or political subdivision of the state, the court may: 
(a) Determine the validity, applicability, and reasonableness of the 
standard. 
(b) If a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption of a 
standard approved and specified by the court. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701 (2011). 
 54. Sax & DiMento, supra note 53, at 6-7. This figure does not include 
collateral cases, but does include condemnation cases. Id. at 7 n.20. 
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interested and opportunistic litigants.55  The Wayne County 
Health Department (WCHD) was the most frequent plaintiff, and 
yet none of its suits went to trial.56  Rather than battle in court, 
the defendants, “large industrial corporations economically able 
to deal with air pollution control problems[,] apparently willing to 
do so when enforcement pressures become strong enough,” and 
faced with adverse publicity, opted to settle.57  Furthermore, 
during the first three years, standing was not successfully 
challenged in any of these suits nor did “broad standing” create 
“practical problems for effective resolution of controversies.”58  
Despite relaxed standing, redundant litigation has been 
avoided.59 
The predicted effect of stifled business and frivolous suits 
appears not to have occurred. First, one-fourth of all surveyed 
suits leading to injunctions targeted public projects, as opposed to 
private business enterprises.60  One-third of all cases involving 
injunctions were suits brought by public agencies.61  Where a 
preliminary injunction was issued, two-thirds of the cases were 
won by plaintiffs, thus validating their initial claims and the 
ensuing injunction.62 
More recently, Michigan’s citizen suit provision has been 
challenged, but without abiding success. In Michigan Citizens for 
Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters North America Inc., the 
Supreme Court of Michigan rolled back lenient standing 
requirements and adopted federal standing requirements as set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders 
 
 55. See generally id. at 23. 
 56. Id. at 23-4 (“[WCHD] has charge of air pollution regulation in the Detroit 
metropolitan area.”). 
 57. Id. at 24. 
 58. Id. at 36. 
 59. Id. at 37–8 (“Once the plaintiffs either win or lose, they accept their 
situation, and neither they nor others sympathetic to their claims attempt to 
relitigate the same issue in a different proceeding.”). Courts have also “been 
rather careful to assure that plaintiffs sue the proper parties.” Id. at 37. 
 60. Sax & DiMento, supra note 53, at 46. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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of Wildlife.63  The Michigan Citizens court read an implied “cases 
and controversies” clause into the Michigan State Constitution.64 
Yet just three years later, Lansing School’s Education 
Association, MEA/NEA v. Lansing Board of Education overruled 
Michigan Citizens, finding that the Michigan State Constitution 
had no “cases and controversies” requirement equivalent to that 
of the federal constitution and therefore the legislature and state 
courts had broader leeway than federal courts in formulating 
standing requirements.65  The Lansing court discussed four 
criteria appropriate for evaluating whether to alter a court-
created rule.66  Such a test is useful when considering whether to 
alter the Society of Plastics standing requirements in New York 
State. It is most useful to focus on the third factor that the 
Lansing court considered: “whether upholding the rule is likely to 
result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests.”67  
Accordingly, the Lansing court held that the federal requirements 
adopted in Michigan Citizens operated at “the expense of public 
 
 63. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. 
Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Mich. 2007). (“First, the plaintiff must have suffered 
an ‘injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete 
and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent’, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent 
action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as 
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable 
decision.” (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 
800, 814 (Mich. 2004)), overruled by Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, MEA/NEA v. 
Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Mich. 2010). 
 64. Michigan Citizens, 737 N.W.2d at 453. “The Lee/Cleveland Cliffs 
majority [upon which the Michigan Citizens majority relied] explained that 
Article III, § 1 of the federal constitution grants federal courts only the ‘judicial 
power’ and Article III, § 2 limits the judicial power to certain ‘Cases’ or 
‘Controversies.’ Although the Michigan Constitution does not include ‘Cases’ or 
‘Controversies’ requirements, the Lee/Cleveland Cliffs majority concluded that 
the Michigan Constitution is analogous to the federal constitution because it 
expressly requires the separation of powers and grants courts only the judicial 
power. The majority further determined that the cornerstone of the judicial 
power is the case-or-controversy requirement.” Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n,, 792 
N.W.2d at 692 (citations omitted). 
 65. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 693–96, 699. 
 66. Id. at 697-98. 
 67. Id. at 698 (citing Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Mich. 
2009)). 
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interests” because the requirements “may prevent litigants from 
enforcing public rights, despite the presence of adverse interests 
and parties, and regardless of whether the Legislature intended a 
private right of enforcement to be part of the statute’s 
enforcement scheme.”68  The court commented, as many 
commentators had noted, that the Lujan standard “has the effect 
of encouraging courts to decide the merits of a case under the 
guise of merely deciding that the plaintiff lacks standing, thus 
using ‘standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who 
are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits.’ ”69 
The temporary setback and subsequent redemption of 
MEPA’s citizen suit provision described above has enormous 
implications for environmental protections in Michigan and 
reveals the dangers of not maintaining lenient standing 
requirements in environmentally-concerned jurisdictions 
throughout the United States. The Lansing court’s view that 
Michigan’s Constitution does not imply a “case or controversy” 
requirement is both the prevalent view in Michigan and a view 
readily applicable to the New York State Constitution. As in 
Michigan, courts would have to read a “case or controversy” 
requirement into the New York State Constitution in order to 
undermine a citizen suit bill through constitutional challenge.70  
But, as the Lansing court stated, judicial striking of a citizen suit 
enacted by a legislature in fact represents a violation of 
separation of powers rather than its preservation. In instances 
where the legislature has voted to allow the judiciary to review 
 
 68. Id. The court’s repudiation of legislative intent’s superiority over public 
interests is noteworthy because the Society of Plastics court deployed the 
legislature’s rejection of a citizen suit provision in SEQRA as proof that more 
lenient standing requirements were inappropriate. See Soc'y of Plastics Indus., 
Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1054 (N.Y. 1991). Moreover, as 
discussed below, the Society of Plastics court misconstrued SEQRA’s legislative 
history, and the legislature in fact never did expressly reject a citizen suit 
provision as part of SEQRA. 
 69. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 698 (quoting Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 
490 (1982)). 
 70. Soc'y of Plastics, 573 N.E.2d at 1040. Even the Society of Plastics court 
acknowledged that there is no “case or controversy” requirement in the New 
York State Constitution. 
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certain matters, it is simply exercising its power to make law.71  
Prior to Lee v. Macomb Co. Board of Commissioners, the case 
which established the precedent followed in Michigan Citizens, 
“no Michigan case had held that the issue of standing posed a 
constitutional issue. Nor did any case hold that Michigan’s 
judicial branch was subject to the same case-or-controversy 
limitation imposed on the federal judicial branch under article III 
of the United States Constitution.”72  Similarly, no New York 
State court has contemplated that standing poses a constitutional 
issue. 
In Michigan Citizens, the petitioners were a non-profit 
corporation “formed to protect and conserve water resources of 
Michigan, particularly in Mecosta County,” the site of the project 
in question” as well as property owners along lakes and streams 
in the County.73  By determining that the petitioners failed to 
 
 71. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 826-
28 (Mich. 2010) (Weaver, J., concurring in result), overruled by Lansing Sch. 
Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d 686 (“While pretending to limit its ‘judicial power,’ the 
majority’s application of Lee’s judicial standing test [contravening legislative 
intent to provide a citizen suit] in this case actually expands the power of the 
judiciary at the expense of the Legislature by undermining the Legislature’s 
constitutional authority to enact laws . . . .”). Early in his concurrence, Weaver 
expounded upon the dangers of judicial interference with statutory purposes: 
I dissent from the majority's analysis of “standing” and “judicial 
power” because this analysis utterly ignores the will of the people of 
Michigan expressed in art. 4, § 52 of our Constitution that 
[t]he conservation and development of the natural resources of 
the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern 
in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the 
people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, 
water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, 
impairment and destruction . . . . 
The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the 
circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred 
or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any 
person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural 
resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction. [MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1) (2014) 
(emphasis added).]. 
Id. at 826. 
 72. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 703 (Weaver, J., concurring) 
(quoting Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. 
Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447, 464 (Mich. 2007)). 
 73. Michigan Citizens, 737 N.W.2d at 450. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/1
1_Butzel&Thimmayya Final REVISED 8/24/2015  12:03 PM 
2015] THE TYRANNY OF PLASTICS 19 
 
prove a particularized injury as required under the adopted 
federal standard, the court found that the petitioners did not 
possess “recreational, aesthetic, or economic interest in” Osprey 
Lake and adjacent wetlands.74  In contrast, Judge P.J. Murphy’s 
concurrence in the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the 
petitioners: 
have standing because of the complex, reciprocal nature of the 
ecosystem that encompasses the pertinent natural resources 
noted above and because of the hydrologic interaction, 
connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources, 
the springs, the aquifer, and defendant Nestlé’s pumping 
activities, whereby impact on one particular resource caused by 
Nestlé’s pumping necessarily affects other resources in the 
surrounding area. Therefore, although there was no evidence 
that plaintiffs actually used or physically participated in 
activities on the Osprey Lake impoundment and wetlands 112, 
115, and 301, environmental injuries to those natural resources 
play a role in any harm caused to the Dead Stream, the Dead 
Stream’s wetlands, and Thompson Lake, which are used by and 
adjacent to property owned by plaintiffs and not the subject of a 
standing challenge.75 
 
Therefore the petitioners asserted, and at least part of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals recognized, fundamental principles of 
deep ecology.76  Remarkably, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
disagreed, even commenting that “pervasive . . . environmental 
damage in an ecosystem” does not matter in the face of the 
plaintiff’s inability to assert injury-in-fact according to federal 
 
 74. Id. at 463. 
 75. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters of N. Am., 
Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (Murphy, J., concurring), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007), overruled by Lansing Sch. 
Educ. Ass'n MEA/NEA v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010). 
Judge Murphy's outlook closely resembles the broad and complex 
interconnectedness of water sources contaminated by the localized construction 
projects at issue in Finger Lakes and Long Island Pine Barrens. See infra Part 
III. 
 76. See generally BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY 7-8 (1985). 
Deep ecology is the notion that the biosphere is largely defined by its 
interconnectedness and one sector’s well-being is inextricably linked to others. 
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standards.77  Although Lansing overruled Michigan Citizens, the 
latter case indicates the dangers of using rigid standing 
requirements to close the doors on environmental plaintiffs. 
Based on the reasoning of Michigan Citizens, real environmental 
degradation may be ignored and courts may subvert our most up-
to-date understanding of the interrelatedness of ecosystems and 
notions of what constitutes a healthy environment.78  With 
Lansing, Michigan attempted to support its environmental 
protection act by guaranteeing citizen oversight.79 
In Anglers of the AuSable, Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality, the plaintiffs attempted to prevent a 
power company from discharging contaminants from an 
environmental cleanup site into a previously unpolluted site.80  
The plaintiffs were seeking to “protect the AuSable River 
watershed.”81  The court granted standing, reiterating that 
Lansing supported the premise that “statutes granting standing” 
should be read “as written.”82  AuSable demonstrates Michigan’s 
current approach to standing and how the citizen suit provision 
fulfills statutory purposes. Concerned citizens were able to 
establish standing even if they lacked special harm.83  The 
concurrence articulated the larger implications of MEPA’s citizen 
standing provision, how the provision influences MEPA, and how 
MEPA, in turn, has impacted environmental regulation: 
Michigan’s EPA was the first legislation of its kind and has 
attracted worldwide attention. The act also has served as a model 
for other states in formulating environmental legislation. The 
enactment of the EPA signals a dramatic change from the 
practice where the important task of environmental law 
 
 77. Michigan Citizens, 737 N.W.2d at 457. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d 686. 
 80. See Anglers of the AuSable, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 793 N.W.2d 
596 (Mich. 2010), vacated, 796 N.W.2d 240 (Mich. 2011). 
 81. AuSable, 793 N.W.2d at 604. 
 82. Id. at 603 (“Accordingly, MEPA, which specifies that ‘any person may 
maintain an action . . . against any person for the protection of the air, water, 
and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction,’ should be applied as it is written.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 83. Id. at 603-04. 
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enforcement was left to administrative agencies without the 
opportunity for participation by individuals or groups of citizens. 
Not every public agency proved to be diligent and dedicated 
defenders of the environment. The EPA has provided a sizable 
share of the initiative for environmental law enforcement for that 
segment of society most directly affected—the public. But the 
EPA does more than give standing to the public and grant 
equitable powers to the circuit courts, it also imposes a duty on 
individuals and organizations both in the public and private 
sectors to prevent or minimize degradation of the environment 
which is caused or is likely to be caused by their activities.84 
Under current standing requirements in New York State, the 
plaintiffs in AuSable may have only been able to achieve standing 
because they owned property along the course of the Ausable 
River or, alternatively, because they demonstrated regular 
recreational use of the river and thereby were able to allege 
special harm.85  Otherwise, if New York State’s standing rules 
had applied to the facts in AuSable, then state-permitted 
unreasonable pollution of public resources would have been 
allowed to continue unabated: 
Defendants have presented no authority for the proposition that 
the diversion of contaminated water from one source to an 
uncontaminated watershed should be considered reasonable. It 
would be incongruous to hold that it is reasonable to 
decontaminate water by contaminating different water. 
Furthermore, it would be unconscionable and destructive for this 
Court to determine that it is reasonable to spread dangerous 
contamination throughout Michigan as we have described. The 
necessarily resulting harm would be spread not only to 
immediate downstream users but, in the end, to anyone in 
Michigan who relies, directly or indirectly, on our state’s water 
remaining clean.86 
 
 84. Id. at 608 (quoting Ray v. Mason Cnty. Drain Comm’r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 
887 (Mich. 1975)). 
 85. See generally AuSable, 793 N.W.2d at 603. Though plaintiffs did own 
property along the AuSable River and indicated they fished in its waters, the 
Michigan court noted that they would have had standing even if they did not 
possess such property nor participated in recreation on the river. Id. 
 86. Id.at 604-05. 
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In other words, the Ausable court would have found standing 
existed simply because the plaintiffs were citizens of Michigan 
seeking to protect the state’s natural resources regardless of the 
plaintiffs’ particular and personal relationship to the river.87 
Michigan represents the broadest of the major categories of 
environmental standing, a group in which any person may bring 
suit to protect resources regardless of injury to the plaintiff, let 
alone special harm. South Dakota, Massachusetts, and Louisiana, 
all possess citizen suit provisions similar to Michigan’s.88 
Minnesota 
Minnesota’s Environmental Rights Act (MERA) is closely 
modeled on Michigan’s.89  MERA essentially removes strict 
standing requirements, which were once present under 
Minnesota’s common law.90  The Act actually advances standing 
 
 87. Id. at 603-04 (“[I]t is clear under MEPA ‘any person’ has standing to 
maintain an action protecting Michigan’s natural resources . . . . Because 
plaintiffs certainly qualify under the statute's designation of ‘any person,’ 
plaintiffs would have standing regardless of the Court's decision in Nestlé ”). 
 88. James R. May, The Availability of State Environmental Citizen Suits, 18 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, no. 4, 2004, at 53, 55, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/james_may/28. 
 89. State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 
30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). A neighboring state's adoption of Michigan's law and 
policy is yet another indicator of MEPA's success in practice. 
 90. Timothy S. Murphy, Environmental Law – Protection of Scenic and 
Aesthetic Resources under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act – State ex 
rel. Drabik v. Martz, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1190, 1195-96 (1991) (“The 
removal of these obstacles allows private citizens effectively to confront 
environmental degradation.”). MERA’s citizen suit provision reads as follows: 
Any person residing within the state; the attorney general; any 
political subdivision of the state; any instrumentality or agency of 
the state or of a political subdivision thereof; or any partnership, 
corporation, association, organization, or other entity having 
shareholders, members, partners or employees residing within the 
state may maintain a civil action in the district court for declaratory 
or equitable relief in the name of the state of Minnesota against any 
person, for the protection of the air, water, land, or other natural 
resources located within the state, whether publicly or privately 
owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction; provided, 
however, that no action shall be allowable hereunder for acts taken 
by a person on land leased or owned by said person pursuant to a 
permit or license issued by the owner of the land to said person 
which do not and cannot reasonably be expected to pollute, impair, 
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beyond MEPA; MERA does not require a plaintiff to show that a 
defendant’s conduct adversely affecting the environment was 
“unreasonable.”91  Nevertheless, Minnesota courts recognize the 
need for a standing filter in the context of MERA.92  Accordingly, 
State by Schaller v. County of Blue Earth established 
requirements for a plaintiff to show a prima facie cause of action 
to fulfill MERA standing. At the outset, the court conceded that 
“almost every human activity has some kind of adverse impact on 
a natural resource” and concluded that it could not “construe 
MERA as prohibiting virtually all human enterprise.”93  There 
are two prongs that plaintiffs must fulfill as part of their prima 
facie case: 1) the threatened resource must be a protected 
resource according to MERA and 2) “conduct by the defendant 
must cause or be likely to cause ‘pollution, impairment or 
destruction’” as defined in MERA.94  The Schaller court followed 
 
or destroy any other air, water, land, or other natural resources 
located within the state; provided further that no action shall be 
allowable under this section for conduct taken by a person pursuant 
to any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, 
license, stipulation agreement or permit issued by the Pollution 
Control Agency, Department of Natural Resources, Department of 
Health or Department of Agriculture. 
MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (2013). Furthermore, MERA contains an environmental 
right invested in the citizens of the state: 
The legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by 
right to the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, 
land, and other natural resources located within the state and that 
each person has the responsibility to contribute to the protection, 
preservation, and enhancement thereof. The legislature further 
declares its policy to create and maintain within the state conditions 
under which human beings and nature can exist in productive 
harmony in order that present and future generations may enjoy 
clean air and water, productive land, and other natural resources 
with which this state has been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the 
public interest to provide an adequate civil remedy to protect air, 
water, land and other natural resources located within the state 
from pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
Id. § 116B.01. 
 91. Murphy, supra note 90, at 1198. Alternatively, “reasonable conduct” is 
recognized as an affirmative defense in Minnesota. 
 92. State by Schaller v. Cnty. of Blue Earth, 563 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 
1997). 
 93. Id. at 265 (quoting Wacouta, 510 N.W.2d at 30). 
 94. Id. at 264. 
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State ex. rel. Wacouta Township v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp. and 
required that the plaintiff fulfill Michigan’s test95 to determine 
whether conduct has or would “materially adversely affect” the 
environment and thereby fulfill the second prong.96  Accordingly, 
in Schaller, the court distilled the second prong into the following 
five-part balancing test to determine whether a new two-lane 
highway “materially adversely affected” the environment: 
(1) The quality and severity of any adverse effects of the proposed 
action on the natural resources affected; 
(2) Whether the natural resources affected are rare, unique, 
endangered, or have historical significance; 
(3) Whether the proposed action will have long-term adverse 
effects on natural resources, including whether the affected 
resources are easily replaceable (for example, by replanting trees 
or restocking fish); 
(4) Whether the proposed action will have significant 
consequential effects on other natural resources (for example, 
whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat is impaired or 
destroyed); [and] 
 
 95. Id. at 265-67; see also People for Envtl. Enlightenment & Responsibility 
(PEER), Inc. v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Minn. 1978) 
(indicating that the Supreme Court of Minnesota frequently utilizes Michigan 
cases to analyze MERA). 
 96. Rather than require conduct be “unreasonably” damaging to the 
environment to qualify for judicial review, MERA demands that conduct 
“materially adversely affect” the environment, a comparatively relaxed 
requirement. The relevant portion of MERA reads as follows: 
“Pollution, impairment or destruction” is any conduct by any person 
which violates, or is likely to violate, any environmental quality 
standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or 
permit of the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political 
subdivision thereof which was issued prior to the date the alleged 
violation occurred or is likely to occur or any conduct which 
materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect 
the environment; provided that “pollution, impairment or 
destruction” shall not include conduct which violates, or is likely to 
violate, any such standard, limitation, rules, order, license, 
stipulation agreement or permit solely because of the introduction of 
an odor into the air. 
MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (2013) (emphasis added). 
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(5) Whether the affected natural resources are significantly 
increasing or decreasing in number, considering the direct and 
consequential impact of the proposed action.97 
The factors are neither exclusive nor dispositive. Rather, 
courts weigh them depending on the type of resource threatened 
by a project.98 
Minnesota’s (and Michigan’s) five-part prima facie impact 
test proves that the presence of a citizen suit provision does not 
eliminate judicial safeguards against frivolous, redundant, and 
inefficient litigation. In fact, the Schaller court held that the 
plaintiff challenging construction of the highway lacked standing 
because the noise estimates he relied upon were inaccurate, 
habitat destruction resulting from the highway’s construction did 
not affect “rare, endangered, or threatened” resources or destroy 
irreplaceable trees, and the affected area was small compared to 
the area condemned for the project.99  Thus, in contrast to New 
York’s plaintiff-centric requirements, the Schaller court espoused 
a standing doctrine focused on injury to the environment rather 
than the plaintiffs. In doing so, Minnesota courts remain 
unhampered by frivolous suits.100  Therefore Minnesota provides 
another worthy example of where a citizen suit empowers the 
public to protect its environment more so than New York and yet 
is reined in by a nuanced and balanced standing test. Again, 
Minnesota’s lack of New York’s special harm requirement enables 
the public to defend its public right101 regardless of private stakes 
in the matter. Like Michigan, Minnesota falls into the most 
 
 97. Schaller, 563 N.W.2d at 267. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. at 265. 
 100. See Zander v. State, 703 N.W.2d 845, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (plaintiffs 
challenged approval of a highway expansion from two to four lanes but failed 
the Schaller test when alleging that the project would destroy “state-listed 
valerian plants” and destroy wetlands); State ex rel. Fort Snelling State Park 
Ass'n v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., 673 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2003) (finding that proposed athletic center constituted no “materially 
adverse effect” on a protected resource); In re Univ. of Minn., 566 N.W.2d 98, 
104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that realtors failed to fulfill the Schaller 
factors when alleging that steam plants would cause a “materially adverse 
effect” on a protected resource). 
 101. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 (2013). 
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generous category of environmental standing, where any person 
may file suit to protect the environment regardless of injury to 
the petitioner and, of course, regardless of special harm.102 
Connecticut 
Connecticut followed Michigan’s lead and passed a citizen 
standing statute in 1971.103  Coupled with a powerful declaration 
of the public trust doctrine,104 Connecticut possesses a formidable 
statutory framework for protecting public environmental 
interests.105  Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Edward J. 
 
 102. May, supra note 88, at 53. 
 103. W. Scott Magargee, Protecting the Environment: Creating a Citizen 
Standing-to-Sue Statute in Virginia, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 235, 246 (1991). The 
Connecticut statute reads: 
The Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state, any 
instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision 
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, 
organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the 
superior court for the judicial district wherein the defendant is 
located, resides or conducts business, except that where the state is 
the defendant, such action shall be brought in the judicial district of 
Hartford, for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any 
political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the 
state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity, acting 
alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public 
trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from 
unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction provided no such 
action shall be maintained against the state for pollution of real 
property acquired by the state under subsection (e) of section 22a-
133m where the spill or discharge which caused the pollution 
occurred prior to the acquisition of the property by the state. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-16 (2013). 
 104. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-15 (“It is hereby found and declared that there is 
a public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state of 
Connecticut and that each person is entitled to the protection, preservation and 
enhancement of the same. It is further found and declared that it is in the public 
interest to provide all persons with an adequate remedy to protect the air, water 
and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution, impairment or 
destruction.”). 
 105. Jennifer E. Sills, Environmental Protection Act (“CEPA”): Enabling 
Citizens to Speak for the Environment, 70 CONN. B. J. 353, 359-60 (1996) (“Once 
a plaintiff has filed a verified pleading in accordance with § 22a-19(a), 
intervention is a matter of right, which the court has no discretion to deny. A 
plaintiff need not prove any pollution, impairment, destruction of the 
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Stockton, though thirty-years old, is still cited as binding 
authority on the question of standing. The lenient requirements 
set forth by the court, since undisturbed by intervening judicial or 
legislative action, suggest frivolous suits as well as self-interested 
and solely economic interests have not sufficiently troubled 
Connecticut’s electorate or judiciary to cause them to disturb 
Manchester Environmental Coalition’s holding. 
Manchester Environmental Coalition involved plaintiffs who 
challenged the construction of an industrial park which was 
approved without an environmental impact statement (EIS), and 
which the plaintiffs alleged would cause pollution of the air due to 
increased auto emissions generated by the park’s employees.106  
The Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed with the trial court 
that the plaintiffs had standing because the Connecticut 
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) “confers standing upon 
‘any person’ to sue ‘any person’ for ‘the protection of the public 
trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state 
from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction.’”107  On 
the one hand, the court’s decision expresses the emphasis of 
actual environmental impact when determining justiciability and, 
on the other hand, discusses the restraints that guarantee that 
relaxed standing requirements do not overburden the courts.108  
In contrast to New York’s decisions under Article 78 proceedings, 
the Manchester Environmental Coalition court did not even 
discuss the identities of the plaintiffs, instead focusing on the 
broad wording of CEPA which granted the plaintiffs standing.109  
Rather than having to plead particularized harm, the plaintiffs 
 
environment in order to have standing, and will have standing even if the 
allegations prove unfounded.” (citation omitted)). 
 106. See Manchester Envtl. Coal. v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981), 
overruled by City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 
2002). 
 107. Id. at 73. 
 108. See id. at 73-76. 
 109. Id. at 73 (“This act expands the class of plaintiffs who are empowered to 
institute proceedings to vindicate public interest. . . . Similar acts . . . . are best 
known for eliminating standing barriers prevalent in traditional litigation. . . . 
[T]he plaintiffs have standing under s 22-16 which confers standing upon ‘any 
person’ to sue ‘any person’ for ‘the protection of the public trust in the air, water, 
and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, 
impairment or destruction.’” (citations omitted)). 
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needed to show how the defendant’s conduct “acting alone, or in 
combination with others, has, or reasonably likely unreasonably 
to pollute, impair, or destroy the public trust in air, water, or 
other natural resources of the state”110  Nevertheless, the 
plaintiffs did not have unbridled access to courts. “The legislative 
history shows that the word ‘unreasonably’ was added [to the 
statute] as a means of preventing lawsuits directed solely for 
harassment purposes.”111  Regarding the particular facts of 
Manchester Environmental Coalition, the trial court found, and 
the appellate court upheld, that the plaintiffs successfully alleged 
prima facie pollution to a resource of the state resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct: increased auto emissions into the state’s air 
due to increased traffic related to the new industrial park.112  The 
standing requirements matched the intent of the statute: the 
plaintiff had to show prima facie damage to a state 
environmental resource.113  Unlike New York, Connecticut’s 
standing requirements under its environmental protection act 
closely align with the act’s intent and thus serve to aid in 
 
 110. Id. at 74 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-17). 
 111. Id. Attorney for the majority leadership of the state’s House of 
Representatives said of the “reasonableness” requirement: 
‘Now in framing this legislation, it was our judgment that all of us 
pollute the environment to one degree or another, simply by 
breathing, obviously we introduce elements into the environment 
which are not natural. And therefore, if we are going to permit the 
use of the courts by citizens to bring lawsuits against those who do 
pollute the environment, we believe there must be a check to prevent 
those suits which are brought simply for harassment, and for no 
other purpose. Therefore, H.B. 5037, which Speaker Ratchford has 
introduced, permits law suits against those who unreasonably 
pollute the environment . . . if S.B. 400 were passed with no check, 
then you might wind up with spite suits between neighbors and that 
sort of thing over conditions that are nothing more than spite 
between neighbors. We feel our bill, which imposes the reasonable 
standard, would be such as to eliminate that possibility.’ 
Manchester Envtl. Coal. v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 74 n.10 (Conn. 1981) (citation 
omitted). 
 112. Manchester, 441 A.2d at 74. 
 113. See City of Waterbury, 800 A.2d at 1132-36  (refining Manchester 
Environmental Coalition by clarifying that Manchester Environmental 
Coalition's holding did not mean that unreasonable pollution occurs merely 
when environmental impairment exceeds de minimis damage. Rather, 
reasonability should be assessed by CEPA's statutory provisions governing the 
defendant’s conduct.). 
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protecting natural resources. Since a plaintiff need not establish 
any actual harm to the environment and thus no injury-in-fact, 
Connecticut is situated with Michigan and Minnesota at the most 
liberal level of standing requirements for environmental suits. 
New Jersey 
Like Connecticut, New Jersey also possesses a citizen suit 
statute permitting public enforcement of state environmental 
laws.114  Courts have read the citizen suit provision to apply 
broadly and literally. In Port of Monmouth Development Corp. v. 
Middletown Township., the court said of the citizen suit 
provision: “it is now well established that where intent is made 
clear in its language, courts will enforce a statute according to its 
terms.”115  The plaintiff in Port of Monmouth was a successor in 
title to land once used as a landfill and sought to compel the 
former municipal operator of the landfill to comply with its 
closure obligations under New Jersey’s Solid Waste Management 
 
 114. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:35a-4 (2013). 
 a. Any person may commence a civil action in a court of competent 
jurisdiction against any other person alleged to be in violation of any 
statute, regulation or ordinance which is designed to prevent or 
minimize pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment. 
The action may be for injunctive or other equitable relief to compel 
compliance with a statute, regulation or ordinance, or to assess civil 
penalties for the violation as provided by law. The action may be 
commenced upon an allegation that a person is in violation, either 
continuously or intermittently, of a statute, regulation or ordinance, 
and that there is a likelihood that the violation will recur in the 
future. 
    b. Except in those instances where the conduct complained of 
constitutes a violation of a statute, regulation or ordinance which 
establishes a more specific standard for the control of pollution, 
impairment or destruction of the environment, any person may 
commence a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for 
declaratory and equitable relief against any other person for the 
protection of the environment, or the interest of the public therein, 
from pollution, impairment or destruction. 
    c. The court may, on the motion of any party, or on its own motion, 
dismiss any action brought pursuant to this act which on its face 
appears to be patently frivolous, harassing or wholly lacking in 
merit. 
 115. Port of Monmouth Dev. Corp. v. Middletown Twp., 551 A.2d 1030, 1033 
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
29
1_Butzel&Thimmayya Final REVISED 8/24/2015  12:03 PM 
30 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
Act (SWMA).116  In line with literal statutory interpretation, the 
court determined that “the Environmental Rights Act permits 
any person to seek enforcement of SWMA.”117  It is worth noting 
that the landfill was “nonhazardous,”118 and that the plaintiff’s 
injury was not discussed at all in that portion of the opinion 
addressing standing. The defendant municipality had failed to 
comply with SWMA because it neglected to cover the closed 
landfill with “a minimum of two feet of compacted cover of soil, 
earth or other insoluble and non-degradable material covered by 
the DEP [New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection].”119  According to the opinion in Howell Township v. 
Waste Disposal Inc., New Jersey’s Environmental Rights Act 
(ERA), which contains the citizen standing provision, “constitutes 
umbrella legislation in an area of great current public concern 
[and] was passed primarily to insure access to the courts by all 
persons interested in abating or preventing environmental 
damage.”120 
Provision (c)121 acts to curtail the kind of lawsuits that may 
be brought under the ERA. Though  “essentially [the ERA] 
empowers any person to maintain an action to enforce or restrain 
violation of any statute, regulation or ordinance establishing 
protection against impairment or destruction of the 
environment,” the act also deploys res judicata and collateral 
estoppel to prevent multiplicity of suits.122  It also grants courts a 
“supervisory role in dismissing ‘patently frivolous, harassing’ 
litigation.”123  Limits on ERA standing were demonstrated in 
Hoboken Environment Committee, Inc. v. German Seaman’s 
Mission of New York, in which the court found a citizens group 
lacked standing to enjoin demolition of a historic building.124 
 
 116. Id. at 1031. 
 117. Id. at 1032. 
 118. Id. at 1030. 
 119. Id. at 1032. 
 120. Howell Twp. v. Waste Disposal Inc., 504 A.2d 19, 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1986). 
 121. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:35a-4. 
 122. Howell, 504 A.2d at 25-26. 
 123. Id. at 26. 
 124. See Hoboken Env’t Comm., Inc. v. German Seaman’s Mission of N.Y., 391 
A.2d 577, 580 (N.J.C. 1978) (“Although this statute grants liberal standing 
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The citizen standing suit has not usurped agency discretion. 
In In re New Jersey Pinelands Commission Resolution, an 
appellate court upheld the trial court’s holding that 
environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge a 
settlement agreement allowing development of land possessing 
endangered timber rattlesnakes.125  The court found the 
Pinelands Commission had already “fulfilled [the] role” of 
prosecuting a violation of the Endangered and Nongame Species 
Conservation Act (ENSCA) because the Commission had made 
“specific provisions in the settlement agreement for immediate 
protection of the timber rattlesnake and its habitat in 
conformance with [the Pinelands Protection Act].”126  Therefore 
the plaintiffs’ role as enforcers of public resource protection had 
already been occupied by an administrative agency. 
Furthermore, subsection (b)127 of the citizen suit statute 
offers a further constraint on plaintiffs. In Springfield v. Lewis, a 
federal court applying New Jersey law found that the plaintiffs 
failed to establish standing under the ERA because there existed 
“a more specific standard for the control of pollution, impairment, 
or destruction of the environment.”128  Peter H. Lehner has 
argued that subdivision (b) of the citizen suit provision is an 
immensely significant check on plaintiff opportunity since, he 
claims, “nearly any governmental license, plan or seal of approval 
count[s] as a ‘specific standard for control of pollution.’ “129  
Therefore, the ERA’s citizen suit provision, which Lehner says 
 
because “every person has a substantial interest in minimizing this condition” of 
polluting and impairing the environment, N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-2, it is clearly limited 
to destruction or harm to the natural environment as opposed to the destruction 
of historical buildings. Plaintiffs' reliance upon this statute is obviously 
misplaced.”)  However the plaintiffs were able to establish standing under other 
statutes. Id. at 581-83. 
 125. See In re N.J. Pinelands Comm. Resolution, 812 A.2d 1113 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 126. Id. at 1119. 
 127. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:35a-4(b). 
 128. See Twp. of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 452 (3d Cir. 1983). The 
“more specific standard” was set forth by an Action Plan, prepared by the 
Federal Highway Administration, elaborating on the procedures required to 
develop highway projects and the environmental effects. Id. at 443. 
 129. Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizen Suits, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL. 
OUTLOOK 4, 11 n.71 (1995). 
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facially “appears to be the broadest citizen suit statute,” 130 
possesses ample counterbalances to the broad public 
empowerment it entails. Yet despite the restraints, New Jersey’s 
citizen suit provision favorably compares to Michigan, Minnesota, 
and Connecticut’s in that it allows any person to file suit 
regardless of injury. 
Illinois 
Illinois has provided its public with the capability to protect 
the environment by including a citizen suit provision in the state 
constitution. Article 11, Section 2 provides not only a right to a 
“healthful environment,” but also a mandate for “each person [to] 
enforce this right.”131  Judicial opinions have differed on the 
meaning of “healthful environment,” and therefore the question 
as to whether a plaintiff’s concerns fall within the zone of 
interests protected by Article 11 often turns on the elasticity of 
the term. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Glisson v. City of 
Marion determined that “healthful environment” did not 
encompass protection of species listed in the Illinois Endangered 
Species Act; rather, “healthful environment” referred to 
conditions strictly favoring human health.132  Nevertheless, the 
legislative history relied upon by the majority in Glisson 
explicitly disavowed a “special injury” requirement thus directly 
rejecting SEQRA’s court-constructed standing requirements.133  
Furthermore, Illinois courts seem to harbor a generous notion of 
standing as it pertains to Article 11; thus, even where 
environmentally-minded plaintiffs have lost in court, such losses 
 
 130. Id. at 10. 
 131. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 132. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1044-45 (Ill. 1999); but see id. 
at 1045 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (arguing that biodiversity is essential to 
human welfare and that the majority inappropriately relied on legislative 
history). 
 133. Id. at 1043 (“Because the wrong here has reached crisis proportions and 
because it affects individuals in so fundamental a way, the Committee is of the 
view that the ‘special injury’ requirement for standing is particularly 
inappropriate and ought to be waived. Section [2], therefore, allows the 
individual the opportunity to prove a violation of his right even though that 
violation may be a public wrong, or one common to the public generally.” 
(quotation omitted)). 
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have been based on the merits and survived standing tests.134  
Courts have even gone so far as to announce that the primary 
intention in enacting Article 11, Section 2 was to remove a 
“special injury” requirement from the common law requirements 
of environmental nuisance claims.135 
As discussed in People v. Pollution Control Board, legislative 
action may modify the reach of standing under Article 11, Section 
2, and Article 11 does not add “substantive causes of action” that 
are not present in other statutes or common law.136  Therefore, 
though Article 11 creates “standing for [the] individual to 
[pursue] the public interest,” it does not provide “new substantive 
rights.”137  When compared to Minnesota and Michigan, the 
Illinois version of the citizen suit thus simultaneously contracts 
and expands the individual’s ability to protect the public interest. 
While on one hand its citizen suit carries the weight of a 
constitutional right, the citizen suit provision of Illinois’ 
constitution does not appreciably expand environmental 
protection causes of action whereas Minnesota and Michigan’s 
citizen suit provisions do provide substantive causes of action. 
Most importantly, however, all three states share a rejection of a 
special harm standing requirement where plaintiffs are seeking 
to enforce environmental protection acts. Illinois, though seeming 
to require injury-in-fact unlike Michigan and Minnesota, has 
nevertheless explicitly rejected New York’s special harm 
requirement. 
Hawai’i 
Like Illinois, Hawai’i possesses a constitutional citizen 
standing provision to protect an environmental right.138  
 
 134. See Ill. Pure Water Comm., Inc. v. Dir. of Pub. Health, 470 N.E.2d 988, 
992 (Ill. 1984). 
 135. See City of Elgin v. Cnty. of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875, 891 (Ill. 1995); see also 
People v. Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
 136. Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d at 456. 
 137. Id. at 455. 
 138. The Hawai’i constitution provides: 
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as 
defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control 
of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of 
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Paralleling the constitutional mandate, Hawai’i’s courts have 
relied on the notion that public interest requires lenient 
standing.139  Hawai’i’s environmental standing doctrine is most 
clearly distinguishable from New York in that the plaintiff need 
not assert a special harm.140  The state judiciary has eased 
standing where environmental well-being is at stake as described 
in Sierra Club v. Hawai’i Tourism Authority ex. rel. Board of 
Directors: 
in cases involving environmental concerns and native Hawai’ian 
rights, this court’s opinions have moved “from ‘legal right’ to 
‘injury in fact’ as the . . . standard . . . for judging whether a 
plaintiff’s stake in a dispute is sufficient to invoke judicial 
intervention[,]” from “economic harm . . . [to inclusion of] 
‘[a]esthetic and environmental well-being’” as interests deserving 
of protection and to the recognition that “a member of the public 
has standing to . . . enforce the rights of the public even though 
his [or her] injury is not different in kind from the public’s 
generally, if he [or she] can show that he [or she] has suffered an 
injury in fact[.]”141 
In other words, in order to establish standing in an 
environmental action, a plaintiff must: 1) have “suffered an 
actual or threatened injury” that 2) must be “fairly traceable to 
the defendant’s actions,” and 3) “a favorable decision [would] 
likely provide relief for plaintiff’s injury;”142 but he or she need 
not show an injury different from that of the general public. The 
dissent in Sierra Club cited the environmental right present in 
Hawai’i’s constitution to justify “less stringent” standing 
 
natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any 
party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, 
subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law. 
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. See also Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 
312 (Haw. 2007). 
 139. See Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1257 (Haw. 1992) (“We hold 
that [the plaintiff] has standing to bring its claims in [public] courts, consistent 
with this court’s decisions lowering standing barriers in cases of public 
interest.”). 
 140. See Sierra Club v. Haw. Tourism Auth. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 59 P.3d 877, 
885 (Haw. 2002). 
 141. Id. at 886 (internal citations omitted). 
 142. Id. 
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requirements.143  In addition, the dissent noted that while 
Hawai’i had elected to follow the general federal doctrine of 
separation of powers, the “cases or controversies” limitation was 
not essential to maintaining such separation of powers.144  
Michigan courts reached the exact same conclusion when 
contemplating whether its own separation of powers restraint 
implied a “cases and controversies” limitation, which would have 
undermined MEPA’s citizen suit provision.145 
Hawai’i’s liberal standing requirements have not resulted in 
a toothless standing doctrine. For example, the plaintiffs in Mottl 
v. Miyahira attempted to link the defendant’s withholding of $6 
million from the University of Hawai’i’s appropriation to the 
degradation of the university’s “work environment.”146  The court 
determined that the allegation was not “specific” enough and 
called for “assumptions or inferences that [were] not supported by 
the record or any case law that the plaintiffs cite.”147  
Furthermore, “[t]he loss of six million dollars could have been 
offset by the university through a tuition increase, a reduction in 
student services, a freeze of administrative—as opposed to 
teaching—staff salaries, or other savings without any discernible 
effect on the faculty members.”148  In short, the plaintiffs “failed 
to assert an injury to a recognized interest” despite their 
numerous analogies between the reduced quality of the “work 
environment” at the university and cases in which standing 
existed where “deterioration of air quality” and “odor nuisance” 
prompted courts to determine that injury to “aesthetic, 
recreational, or conservational interests” had occurred.149  
Hawai’i’s courts have thus been successful in barring suits, even 
with a constitutional environmental citizen suit provision, when 
environmental well-being was not a genuine issue. Hawai’i is 
similar to Illinois in that it has a constitutional environmental 
citizen suit provision, but injury-in-fact remains a hurdle that 
 
 143. Id. at 911 (Moon, C.J., dissenting). 
 144. See id. at 908 n.8 (Moon, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 886. 
 145. See supra pp. 14-22. 
 146. Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716, 729 (Haw. 2001). 
 147. Id. at 730. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 729-30. 
35
1_Butzel&Thimmayya Final REVISED 8/24/2015  12:03 PM 
36 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
must be overcome by petitioners. Even though not as lenient as 
Michigan and Minnesota, Hawai’i espouses what should now be a 
familiar theme to the reader: a rejection of New York’s special 
harm requirement.150 
Florida 
Florida’s Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (FEPA)151 
provides that citizens may “maintain an action for injunctive 
 
 150. Pennsylvania, though possessing a “self-executing,” Payne v. Kassab, 312 
A.2d 86, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 1973), environmental right, has substantially 
narrowed that right and thus presents a less significant improvement over New 
York’s standing requirements than Illinois and Hawai’i. PA. CONS. art I, §27 
(“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's 
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including 
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”). 
 151. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (2014). 
(1) This section shall be known and may be cited as the 
“Environmental Protection Act of 1971.” 
(2) (a) The Department of Legal Affairs, any political subdivision or 
municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an 
action for injunctive relief against: 
1. Any governmental agency or authority charged by law 
with the duty of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations for the 
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of 
the state to compel such governmental authority to enforce 
such laws, rules, and regulations; 
2. Any person, natural or corporate, or governmental agency 
or authority to enjoin such persons, agencies, or authorities 
from violating any laws, rules, or regulations for the 
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of 
the state. 
(b) In any suit under paragraph (a), the Department of Legal 
Affairs may intervene to represent the interests of the state. 
(c) As a condition precedent to the institution of an action 
pursuant to paragraph (a), the complaining party shall first file 
with the governmental agencies or authorities charged by law 
with the duty of regulating or prohibiting the act or conduct 
complained of a verified complaint setting forth the facts upon 
which the complaint is based and the manner in which the 
complaining party is affected. Upon receipt of a complaint, the 
governmental agency or authority shall forthwith transmit, by 
registered or certified mail, a copy of such complaint to those 
parties charged with violating the laws, rules, and regulations 
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for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources 
of the state. The agency receiving such complaint shall have 30 
days after the receipt thereof within which to take appropriate 
action. If such action is not taken within the time prescribed, the 
complaining party may institute the judicial proceedings 
authorized in paragraph (a). However, failure to comply with this 
subsection shall not bar an action for a temporary restraining 
order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm from the 
conduct or activity complained of. 
(d) In any action instituted pursuant to paragraph (a), the court, 
in the interest of justice, may add as party defendant any 
governmental agency or authority charged with the duty of 
enforcing the applicable laws, rules, and regulations for the 
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the 
state. 
(e) No action pursuant to this section may be maintained if the 
person (natural or corporate) or governmental agency or 
authority charged with pollution, impairment, or destruction of 
the air, water, or other natural resources of the state is acting or 
conducting operations pursuant to currently valid permit or 
certificate covering such operations, issued by the appropriate 
governmental authorities or agencies, and is complying with the 
requirements of said permits or certificates. 
(f) In any action instituted pursuant to this section, other than 
an action involving a state NPDES permit authorized under s. 
403.0885, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to costs 
and attorney's fees. Any award of attorney's fees in an action 
involving such a state NPDES permit shall be discretionary with 
the court. If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the 
solvency of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or 
judgment which might be rendered against him or her in an 
action brought under this section, the court may order the 
plaintiff to post a good and sufficient surety bond or cash. 
(3) The court may grant injunctive relief and impose conditions on 
the defendant which are consistent with and in accordance with law 
and any rules or regulations adopted by any state or local 
governmental agency which is charged to protect the air, water, and 
other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or 
destruction. 
(4) The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel shall apply. 
The court shall make such orders as necessary to avoid multiplicity 
of actions. 
(5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized 
by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources 
of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the 
Department of Legal Affairs, a political subdivision or municipality 
of the state, or a citizen of the state shall have standing to intervene 
as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the 
activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will 
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relief” against governmental entities for failing to enforce, and 
against nongovernmental entities for violations of, “laws, rules, 
and regulations for the protection of the air, water, and other 
natural resources of the state.”152  In an explicit rejection of New 
York State’s standing doctrine, Florida Wildlife Federation v. 
State Department of Environmental Regulation states: 
If the legislature had meant for the special injury rule to be 
preserved in the area of environmental protection, it could easily 
have said so. We presume legislative awareness of the law of 
 
have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, 
water, or other natural resources of the state. As used in this section 
and as it relates to citizens, the term “intervene” means to join an 
ongoing s. 120.569 or s. 120.57 proceeding; this section does not 
authorize a citizen to institute, initiate, petition for, or request a 
proceeding under s. 120.569 or s. 120.57. Nothing herein limits or 
prohibits a citizen whose substantial interests will be determined or 
affected by a proposed agency action from initiating a formal 
administrative proceeding under s. 120.569 or s. 120.57. A citizen's 
substantial interests will be considered to be determined or affected 
if the party demonstrates it may suffer an injury in fact which is of 
sufficient immediacy and is of the type and nature intended to be 
protected by this chapter. No demonstration of special injury 
different in kind from the general public at large is required. A 
sufficient demonstration of a substantial interest may be made by a 
petitioner who establishes that the proposed activity, conduct, or 
product to be licensed or permitted affects the petitioner's use or 
enjoyment of air, water, or natural resources protected by this 
chapter. 
(6) Any Florida corporation not for profit which has at least 25 
current members residing within the county where the activity is 
proposed, and which was formed for the purpose of the protection of 
the environment, fish and wildlife resources, and protection of air 
and water quality, may initiate a hearing pursuant to s. 120.569 or s. 
120.57, provided that the Florida corporation not for profit was 
formed at least 1 year prior to the date of the filing of the application 
for a permit, license, or authorization that is the subject of the notice 
of proposed agency action. 
(7) In a matter pertaining to a federally delegated or approved 
program, a citizen of the state may initiate an administrative 
proceeding under this subsection if the citizen meets the standing 
requirements for judicial review of a case or controversy pursuant to 
Article III of the United States Constitution. 
(8) Venue of any causes brought under this law shall lie in the 
county or counties wherein the cause of action is alleged to have 
occurred. Id. 
 152. See id. § 403.412 (2)(a)(1). 
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public nuisance with its special injury requirement. That the 
legislature chose to allow citizens to bring an action where an 
action already existed for those who had special injury persuades 
us that the legislature did not intend that the special injury rule 
carry over to suits brought under the EPA. 
A reading of the entire EPA further bolsters this conclusion. The 
act limits private plaintiffs to citizens, thereby countering some 
of the multiple suit problems by precluding just any person from 
coming into this state and instituting suit. Also, numerous 
conditions precedent, as previously discussed, have been set out. 
Provision has been made to protect those operations conducted 
under governmental permits. In an obvious effort to limit 
frivolous suits, the act provides that trial courts may require 
plaintiffs to post bond. Finally, subsection (3) provides that the 
trial courts may grant injunctive relief and impose conditions 
consistent with law, rules, and regulations, thereby preserving 
the court’s discretion as to whether or not the moving party has 
stated a case sufficient to motivate granting the requested relief. 
We hold, therefore, that section 403.412 creates a new cause of 
action and that private citizens of Florida may institute suit 
under that statute without a showing of special injury. As far as 
what showing is necessary to state a cause of action under the 
EPA, we note that a mere allegation of irreparable injury not 
sustained by the allegation of facts will not ordinarily warrant 
the granting of injunctive relief.153 
The court elaborated upon “conditions precedent” to filing a 
citizen suit: 
An interested party must first file a complaint with the 
appropriate agency. The complaint must set out the facts upon 
which it is based and the manner in which the complainant is 
affected. Thereafter, the agency has thirty days in which to act on 
the complaint. Only after meeting these requirements and giving 
the agency the opportunity to act may a complainant file suit in a 
court of law.154 
 
 153. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 390 So. 2d 64, 67 
(Fla. 1980) (citation omitted); see also Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 702 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (describing the 
legislature’s view of environmental protection as implying “collective 
responsibility” yet precluding non-citizens from utilizing the citizen suit). 
 154. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 390 So. 2d at 66. 
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Yet another case, Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County 
Pollution Control Commission, represents an early rejection of 
requisite special injury to bring suit and also reinforces the 
“concept of liberality of pleading”: 
It is exceedingly difficult for us to reasonably perceive, despite 
the very persuasive oral argument of counsel for appellees to the 
contrary, that appellant, comprising a group of lay citizens 
interested in protecting and upgrading the environment, would 
have any further knowledge of the action or nonaction of the 
appellees in the premises other than that alleged in its 
complaint. To require appellant to plead its case with more 
particularity and specificity would be inconsistent with the well 
accepted and understood concept of liberality in pleading. 
On the authority of the statute and this court’s opinion in the 
case of Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corporation, 
the appellant does have Standing to sue and is not required to 
show special injury beyond that sustained by the general 
public.155 
Thus, the court permitted a non-profit corporation to achieve 
standing based on a generalized complaint that its members had 
“regularly over the years” used Tampa Bay for “bathing, 
swimming, fishing, boating, water sports, and generally as a 
recreation and play area,” and the defendant utility company 
polluted the bay by means of releasing effluent emissions into the 
tributaries of the bay, which was impermissible under Florida 
law and regulations.156  Evidently, however, injury-in-fact 
against the public at large is required to establish standing; Save 
Our Bay implied an injury-in-fact requirement by stating 
“appellant does have standing to sue and is not required to show 
special injury beyond that sustained by the general public.”157  
Florida Wildlife Federation appended its rejection of special 
injury with the reminder that “a mere allegation of irreparable 
injury not sustained by the allegation of facts will not ordinarily 
warrant the granting of injunctive relief.”158 
 
 155. Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pollution Control Comm’r, 285 
So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (citation omitted). 
 156. Id. at 448. 
 157. Save Our Bay, 285 So. 2d at 449 (emphasis added). 
 158. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 390 So. 2d at 67. 
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In addition, the citizen suit statute provides insulation for 
state permitting and licensing activities, and such protections 
were judicially recognized in Greene v. State Department of 
Natural Resources. In Greene, a petitioner sought injunctive relief 
under FEPA section 403.412 (containing the citizen suit 
provision) and an administrative hearing regarding State land 
purchases as part of Florida’s Conservation and Recreation Land 
Committee (CARL).159  The court distinguished between the 
citizen suit in FEPA section 403.412, requiring no “special injury” 
to bring an action in circuit court, and the petitioner’s attempts to 
use the citizen suit as a “springboard” to initiate an 
administrative proceeding.160 
Despite the circuit court/administrative proceeding 
dichotomy, the state of Florida, via its legislature, saw fit to 
include a citizen suit provision in its environmental protection act 
when FEPA was passed four decades ago and has not since 
perceived cause to retract this right from its citizens.161  Indeed, 
the court in Florida Wildlife Federation associates the legislative 
purpose stated in FEPA with the specific citizen suit provision 
contained therein,162 and other states passing legislation 
espousing a similar desire to protect natural resources, such as 
New York, would do well to recognize the interplay between 
legislative purpose and the citizen suit. Overall, Florida 
represents a level of citizen standing more generous than New 
York, but not as liberal as Connecticut, Minnesota, Michigan, and 
New Jersey. Special injury is not required, but injury-in-fact 
remains a hurdle that the plaintiff must clear. 
 
 159. Greene v. State Dep't of Nat. Res., 414 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982). 
 160. Id. at 253–54. 
 161. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (2)(a)(1) (2014). 
 162. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 390 So. 2d at 66. (“Over a decade ago, the electors of 
Florida amended the state constitution to add section 7 to article II of that 
document. That section states the public's intent that it 'be the policy of the 
state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty.'  Section 7 
further provides that '(a)dequate provision shall be made by law for the 
abatement of air and water pollution.' To help effectuate that policy, the 
legislature enacted the EPA as section 403.412 in 1971.”) 
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 California 
California, though lacking an environmental citizen suit 
provision, possesses more lenient standing requirements than 
New York by virtue of an exception to its writ of mandamus 
standing rules. To obtain a writ of mandamus for an injunction, a 
party must establish a “beneficial interest” in obtaining such an 
injunction.163  The “beneficial interest” has been defined as “ 
‘some special interest to be served or some particular right to be 
reserved or protected over and above the public interest held in 
common with the public at large.’ ”164  On its face, such a 
requirement would seem to be in line with New York’s special 
harm standing requirement. But there is a notable exception 
which enhances environmental protection in California and 
makes it more formidable than SEQRA’s public enforcement 
mechanism. 
The Supreme Court of California has stated that the “effects 
of environmental abuse are not contained by political lines; strict 
rules of standing that might be appropriate in other contexts 
have no application where broad and long-term effects are 
involved.”165  If a court determines such “broad and long-term 
effects” to be so widespread that they infringe upon a public right, 
then an “exception to the beneficial interest requirement” 
exists.166  The public right/duty falls within the California 
Environmental Quality Act’s (CEQA’s)167 subject matter. 168 
 
 163. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 2013). 
 164. Prime Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. v. Valley Health Sys. (In re Valley Health 
Sys.), 429 B.R. 692, 739 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Carsten v. Psychology 
Examining Comm., 614 P.2d 276, 278 (Cal. 1980)). 
 165. Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 529 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Cal. 
1975). 
 166. See In re Valley Health Sys., 429 B.R. at 739; Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. 
Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365 (Ct. App. 1963) (“However, where the enforcement of 
the action is to procure enforcement of a public duty, this rule [beneficial 
interest requirement] has been modified to permit property owners and others 
to sue in mandamus since they have an interest as such in seeing that the public 
duties are enforced.”); Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1023 (“Moreover, plaintiffs have 
standing ‘to procure enforcement of a public duty . . . .’”). 
 167. Henry Michael Domzalski II, Bozung v. LAFCO: Municipal Boundary 
Changes and the California Environmental Quality Act, 6 GOLDEN GATE U.L. 
REV. 203, 209 (1975-1976). CEQA is California’s state equivalent of NEPA and 
SEQRA. Like NEPA and SEQRA, “the most conspicuous of CEQA’s mandates is 
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The limits of “broad and long-term” effects prove somewhat 
elusive. An examination of facts where the exception has been 
invoked by plaintiffs and upheld by the courts provides some 
guidance. In Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 
plaintiffs challenged a city’s annexation ordinance that occurred 
without preparation of an EIS as required by CEQA.169  The court 
pointed out that one of the plaintiffs had standing based on his 
residency 1,800 feet from the affected property and such 
proximity was sufficient to fit within the public duty exception.170  
However, later in the opinion, the court remarks that all the 
plaintiffs had standing to achieve enforcement of a public duty.171 
Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co. shed further light on the 
public duty exception, holding that “where the enforcement of the 
action is to procure enforcement of a public duty, this rule has 
been modified to permit property owners and others to sue in 
mandamus, since they have an interest in such to see that public 
duties are enforced.”172  The court further remarked that “where 
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus 
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need 
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, 
since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the 
laws executed and the duty in question enforced.”173 
The public duty in Kappadahl was the obligation of building 
inspectors to not issue building permits in violation of zoning 
ordinances. Even though the court admitted that the petitioners 
 
that an EIR [Environmental Impact Report] be filed by all public agencies, 
boards commissions, which propose to carry out or approve any project which 
may have a significant effect on the environment.” Id. . 
 168. Matthews, supra note 11, at 450; see Citizens Ass’n for Sensible Dev. of 
Bishop Area v. Cnty. of Inyo, 217 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897 (Ct. App. 1985) (“However, 
where a public right is involved, and the object of the writ of mandate is to 
procure enforcement of a public duty, the plaintiff is not required to have any 
legal or special interest in the result . . . . Accordingly, in a writ of mandate 
against a municipal entity based on alleged violations of CEQA, a property 
owner, taxpayer, or elector who establishes a geographical nexus with the site of 
the challenged project has standing.”). 
 169. Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1023. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365 (Ct. App. 1963). 
 173. Id. 
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had not alleged “damage to the petitioners [or] other persons 
similarly situated,” it inferred an expected injury owing to a 
devaluation of property due to increased traffic resulting from the 
permitted construction.174  But the right does not seem limited to 
property owners, as “taxpayers” are also individuals positioned to 
invoke the public duty exception (presumably because taxpayers 
have a fiduciary interest in seeing to it that government agencies 
properly perform their functions).175  In Hollman v. Warren, 
where the taxpaying petitioner alleged the governor needed to at 
least consider applications for notary appointments, the court 
applied the exception.176  Therefore, unlike suits under SEQRA, 
California waives the special harm requirement for standing 
where the public interest is concerned. 
At the same time, a zone of interest requirement helps to 
prevent frivolous and harassing suits. In Regency Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. v. City of West Hollywood, the Court of Appeal 
for the Second District determined that the plaintiff, an 
advertising company, alleged “no environmental injury” as result 
of a recent amendment to a city ordinance.177  The advertising 
company, Regency, challenged the amendment because an earlier 
amendment had compelled Regency to remove a tall wall sign 
and, in the wake of the removal, competitors had occupied the 
space.178  In light of the new amendment essentially restoring the 
original standard under which Regency had legally occupied the 
wall space, Regency alleged the city was playing “political 
favorites,” resulting in the loss of three years income for the 
agency.179  In court, Regency based its claim on the city’s failure 
to review the environmental impact of restoring the old standard 
as required by CEQA.180  The Court of Appeal, however, was not 
persuaded that Regency had a “continuing interest or 
commitment to the subject matter” of CEQA even though 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Hollman v. Warren, 196 P.2d 562, 566 (Cal. 1948). 
 177. Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of W. Hollywood, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
287, 291 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 178. Id. at 289. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 290. 
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Regency offered evidence of having initiating four prior CEQA 
suits.181  The court characterized three of the four prior suits as 
actions undertaken by Regency for the purposes of advancing its 
“competitive and commercial interests.”182  Thus Regency failed 
to fulfill the requirements for a corporation to achieve citizen 
standing. 
The Regency Outdoor Advertising court largely relied upon 
Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of 
Alameda, which set forth the limitations of standing under CEQA 
and differentiated between a legitimate citizen suit and a purely 
self-interested action.183  The Waste Management court asserted 
that “CEQA is not a fair competition statutory scheme” and the 
plaintiff’s “commercial and competitive interests [were] not 
within the zone of interests CEQA was intended to preserve or 
protect.”184  The court then provided a lengthy distillation of the 
“citizen suit” exception to the “beneficial interest” standing 
requirements.185  The opinion indicates that “citizen standing” in 
public right claims represents “an exception to, rather than a 
repudiation of, the usual requirement of beneficial interest.”186  
Furthermore, “[t]he policy underlying the exception may be 
outweighed by competing considerations of a more urgent 
nature.”187 
California courts possess a history of such findings. The 
Waste Management court cited McDonald v. Stockton 
 
 181. Id. at 293 
 182. Id. (three of the four suits were filed against Regency's competitors for 
billboard space). 
 183. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., Inc. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
740 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 184. Id. at 748-49. 
Numerous findings and declarations were made by the Legislature with 
respect to CEQA. None of them suggest a purpose of fostering, 
protecting, or otherwise affecting economic competition among 
commercial enterprises. Thus, [the petitioner's] commercial and 
competitive interests are not within the zone of interests CEQA was 
intended to preserve or protect and cannot serve as a beneficial interest 
for purposes of the standing requirement. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 185. Id. at 749-51. 
 186. Id. at 750. 
 187. Id. 
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Metropolitan Transit as a situation where “the court rejected a 
citizen’s suit because the action would have intruded upon the 
remedial discretion of a public agency that was quite able to 
protect its own interests.”188  The Waste Management court also 
noted that in Carsten v. Psychology Examining Commission, a 
member of an administrative board could not pursue a suit 
against the board because “ ‘[h]er interest in the subject matter 
was piqued by service on the board, not by virtue of the neutrality 
of citizenship.’ ”189 
As the above California cases demonstrate, though standing 
to file citizen suits upholding CEQA is determined by California’s 
common law, and although the “broad” reach of a citizen’s 
interest is amorphous, courts’ standing decisions emphasize a 
citizen’s right to enjoin the government to perform its public duty 
rather than rely on the plaintiff’s allegation of special harm. It is 
difficult to place California’s environmental standing 
requirements in relation to the most generous frameworks 
(Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Connecticut), and those states 
which rely on injury-in-fact (Illinois, Florida, Hawai’i). Even 
though the “beneficial interest” standard seems to be relaxed in 
cases where a plaintiff invokes a public duty neglected by the 
government, it is unclear whether this can extend to private 
defendants. It is easy, however, to glean that California joins 
 
 188. Id. The federal Department of Transportation (DOT) was in a contractual 
relationship with the local transit authority against which the DOT could seek 
breach of contract remedies, including specific performance (installation of bus 
stop shelters) or withholding of federal funds. See McDonald v. Stockton Metro. 
Transit Dist., 111 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641-43 (Ct. App. 1973). Therefore a citizen's 
suit would have infringed upon the DOT's discretion to seek performance under 
the contract or withhold federal funds. See id. at 643. The bus stop shelters were 
only afforded to the McDonald plaintiffs by virtue of the contract between DOT 
and the local transit authority and “mandamus is not appropriate to enforce the 
contractual obligations of a public body.”  Id. at 642. 
 189. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (quoting Carsten 
v. Psychology Examining Comm’n, 614 P.2d 276, 280 (Cal. 1980)). Though Save 
the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach repudiated Waste 
Management’s distinction between corporate and individual standing 
requirements, it did not disturb the court’s finding that Waste Management’s 
motivations were based on business competition and the holding that such 
motivations were improper grounds for a plaintiff to invoke the public right 
exception. See Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 
1005, 1014 n.5 (Cal. 2011). 
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most other jurisdictions in rejecting New York’s special harm 
requirement. 
V. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL REFORM IN 
NEW YORK STATE 
Save the Pine Bush offers hope for environmental groups 
seeking to protect natural resources that the groups can prove 
individual members regularly utilize and enjoy.190  The case 
suggests that the Court of Appeals harbors some willingness to 
tinker with Society of Plastics’ standing apparatus. It was a 
tentative though inadequate step towards reforming the 
confusion and environmental harm that Society of Plastics has 
wrought on the principles SEQRA is intended to uphold. 
However, recently, in Clean Water Advocates of New York v. New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation, the 
Society of Plastics test again produced an unreasonable result 
and serves as a reminder that much remains to be done in the 
wake of Save the Pine Bush before New York State citizens and 
public interest organizations can fully benefit from SEQRA’s 
original goals.191 
Clean Water Advocates involved a challenge to stormwater 
discharge of pollutants over a wide watershed.192  Though the 
appellate division acknowledged that the plaintiff non-profit had 
alleged runoff from construction of a Wal-Mart would impact 
members who used nearby bodies of water for recreation and 
potable water supply, the court nevertheless did not reach the 
merits of the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs failed to 
show that they used the water sources more frequently than 
nonparties.193  The decision implies a perverse incentive for 
 
 190. See supra p. 3-4. 
 191. Clean Water Advocates of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 
962 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. Div. 2013). 
 192. Id. at 391. 
 193. Id. at 393. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that 
Wal-Mart's stormwater pollution prevention plan would specifically lead to 
pollution of Tonawanda Creek, the Erie Canal, Lake Ontario, and the Niagara 
River. Id. at 392. Instead the court described the plaintiff's petition as alleging 
that stormwater runoff from constructive activities in general tended to pollute 
the named bodies of water. Id. However, the court's independent finding that 
the plaintiffs failed to allege special harm would have barred the suit even if 
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environmentally mindful plaintiffs: in order to be heard in court, 
they may have to downplay the sweep of an environmental threat 
and the number of people affected in order to demonstrate that 
they suffer to a greater degree than the public-at-large. Such a 
course would not only frustrate SEQRA’s purposes but also in fact 
hinder its application by shrouding widespread environmental 
degradation in carefully packaged and overly specific complaints, 
which do not reflect the factual breadth of environmental 
impacts. Thus Society of Plastics not only disqualifies legitimate 
SEQRA claims but may also distort fact-finding related to the 
merits of a claim. 
The stormwater pollution not considered in Clean Water 
Advocates, just like the noise and dust in Finger Lakes Coalition, 
the contamination of the sole source aquifer in Long Island Pine 
Barrens, the construction of the power plant in East End 
Property, and the depletion of Saratoga Lake in Saratoga Lake 
and Improvement District, all represent palpable environmental 
threats which were not examined by courts simply because 
Society of Plastics standards disqualified the plaintiffs. 
It is worth noting that not only is the Society of Plastics test 
contrary to the purposes and values of SEQRA, but the 
precedential path the court followed to reach the decision is 
highly suspect. Society of Plastics cited Matter of Mobile Oil v. 
Syracuse Industrial Development Agency, which, in turn, relied on 
Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals of Town 
of North Hempstead.194  In Sun-Brite, the petitioner was a lessee 
of a car wash objecting to a zoning board’s approval of the 
construction of another car wash on a neighboring property.195  
The board’s approval involved granting a variance for a non-
 
Clean Water Advocates had alleged that Wal-Mart's stormwater treatment plan 
in particular would result in increased pollution of waterways. Id. at 392-93 
(“Moreover, petitioner has not shown that any injuries that its members would 
suffer due to the alleged impacts to the water bodies would be different from 
that faced by the general public. Although petitioner alleges that its members 
use the water bodies for recreational purposes and as their potable water source, 
it does not allege, much less submit evidence, that any of its members do so any 
more frequently than any other person with physical access to those same 
resources.”). 
 194. Williams, supra note 1, at 173-174. 
 195. Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 508 N.E.2d 130, 
131 (N.Y. 1987). 
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conforming use.196  For purposes of standing, the petitioner 
suggested increased competition due to the new carwash qualified 
it as an “aggrieved” petitioner. Sun-Brite was an “article 78 
proceeding to annul the Board’s [of Zoning and Appeals] 
determination.”197  The Court of Appeals in Sun-Brite makes no 
mention of SEQRA, its purposes, content, or policy. Nevertheless, 
in Mobile Oil, clearly a SEQRA case in which the petitioner 
challenged the EIS regarding a proposed shopping mall,198 the 
Court of Appeals relied upon Sun-Brite and in doing so adopted 
the special harm requirement that is so undesirable in the 
context of SEQRA.199  Thus Mobile Oil is where the trail leading 
up to Society of Plastics took an inappropriate turn. As Joan 
Leary Matthews200 has pointed out: 
[I]t was wrong for the New York Court of Appeals to have 
incorporated the zoning enforcement special harm requirement 
into the SEQRA context. Enjoining a zoning violation is not in 
the same posture as a preemptive challenge under SEQRA where 
a petitioner alleges that an environmental review for an 
impending project was inadequate. The restrictive standing 
requirements on the zoning/land use model are inappropriate for 
SEQRA claims, particularly given SEQRA’s broad mandate. The 
presumption should be to grant standing, not to deny it.201  
Other critics of Society of Plastics suggest that Har 
Enterprises v. Town of Brookhaven, a SEQRA case in which a 
property owner appealed a town board decision to rezone property 
from commercial to residential use,202 would, when compared to 
Sun-Brite, have been a far more appropriate case for the Mobile 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 559 N.E.2d 641, 642 
(N.Y. 1990). 
 199. Id. at 643-44. 
 200. Joan Leary Matthews is the Director of the Clean Water Division of the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region 2. See Organization 
Chart for EPA's Region 2 Office, EPA, 
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/organization-chart-epas-region-2-office#clean 
(last updated July 4, 2014). 
 201. Matthews, supra note 11, at 444. 
 202. Har Enters. v. Town of Brookhaven, 548 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (N.Y. 1989). 
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Oil court to invoke.203  In Har, the petitioner specifically alleged 
that the town board failed to comply with SEQRA by issuing an 
inadequate declaration that the rezoning would not result in 
“significant adverse environmental impact.”204  The court held 
that “[a] showing of special damage or actual injury is not always 
necessary to establish a party’s standing.”205  Har broadened 
standing requirements to encompass plaintiffs who have “a 
significant interest in having the mandates of SEQRA enforced,” 
and, despite the court citing the plaintiff’s ownership status over 
the parcels which the town board was attempting to rezone, Har 
did not “delimit the parameters of the zone of interest in SEQRA 
compliance or define the precise nexus with the proposed action 
that a party must demonstrate in order to object for failure of 
compliance.”206  Therefore, through adopting Mobile Oil’s view, 
which incorrectly relied on Sun-Brite and neglected Har, the 
precedential aspect of Society of Plastics stands on shaky 
ground.207 
Aside from utilizing suspect precedent, the Society of Plastics 
court misstated the legislative history of SEQRA. Critics and 
supporters of Society of Plastics have described how the Society of 
Plastics court pointed to a supposed rejection of a citizen suit 
provision in 1975, the year SEQRA was passed, as proof that the 
 
 203. Williams, supra note 1, at 174. 
 204. Har Enters., 548 N.E.2d at 1291. 
 205. Id. at 1292. 
 206. Id. at 1292-93. “To adopt the rule urged by respondent and deny 
standing—absent an allegation that the owner will suffer some adverse 
environmental consequence—would insulate decisions such as this from judicial 
review, a result clearly contrary to the public interest.”  Id. at 1293. “In some 
instances, the party’s particular relationship to the subject of the action may 
give rise to a presumption of standing.”  Id. at 1292. Note that the court chose 
the more generalized term “party” rather than a term denoting property rights 
(e.g. land owner). 
 207. Philip Weinberg also points out that the plaintiffs in Society of Plastics 
and Mobile Oil were “industry plaintiffs” and in Society of Plastics the plaintiff 
was actually seeking to “derail environmentally beneficial legislation.”  Philip 
Weinberg, Are Standing Requirements Becoming the Great Barrier Reef Against 
Environmental Actions?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 19-20 (1999) (“There is much 
irony and scant justification for the courts now using these decisions to block 
suits by those asserting genuine environmental concerns.”). 
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legislature intended to limit citizen standing under SEQRA.208  
However, there was no such provision in SEQRA. There were two 
citizen suit bills considered by the state legislature in 1975, but 
these bills were independent of SEQRA and pertained to claims 
beyond SEQRA’s zone of interests.209  The Society of Plastics 
court conflated the unrelated bills with SEQRA and thus 
inaccurately characterized the legislative intent behind 
SEQRA.210 
Indeed, citizen standing in non-SEQRA government 
compliance cases illustrate that the Society of Plastics test lags 
behind established citizen-initiated review standards of 
government conduct.211  Courts other than the Har court have 
 
 208. See Matthews, supra note 11, at 441-42; see also Daniel A. Coffey, A 
Critique of New York’s Proposed Private Environmental Law Enforcement Act, 2 
ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 23, 26 (1995) (conflating the citizen standing bills with 
SEQRA partly due to the Society of Plastics opinion). 
 209. Matthews, supra note 11, at 441-42. 
 210. The Society of Plastics court misstated the legislative history as follows: 
A “citizen suits” bill, once included in the proposed legislation, did 
not appear in the final version. This bill, which several times failed 
to gain legislative approval, would have added an article 10 to the 
Environmental Conservation Law granting “standing to any person . 
. . to institute an action for conservation and protection of the air, 
water and other environmental resources of the state,” whether that 
person was aggrieved or not. 
Originally providing virtually unlimited access to the courts for 
concerned citizens, several “safeguards” were later added to the 
“citizen suits” bill—including a requirement that the party bringing 
the action post a $500 bond and submit an affidavit of a “technically 
qualified person” indicating the grounds for the suit. Those 
amendments were a response to concerns that the bill would open 
the floodgates to litigation. Sponsors of the measure attempted to 
portray it as one that would allow concerned citizens, with no 
prospect of personal financial gain, to maintain litigation benefiting 
all the people of the state, while the opposition characterized the bill 
as encouraging “use of environmental protection machinery as a 
delaying, obstructive tactic.” 
By rejecting the proposed open door policy, the Legislature made 
clear that some limitation on standing to challenge administrative 
action was appropriate. 
Soc'y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (N.Y. 
1991) (citations omitted). 
 211. See, e.g., Samuelsen v. Walder, 907 N.Y.S.2d 784, 791 (Sup. Ct. 2010), 
rev’d, 932 N.Y.S.2d 30 (App. Div. 2011) (“In the non-SEQRA context, New York 
courts have taken a broader view of both individual and associational standing 
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insinuated discomfort with the stringency of Society of Plastics.212  
New York courts have hinted and other jurisdictions have 
zealously proclaimed that concerned and potentially impacted 
citizens should be able to defend essential public natural 
resources such as underground aquifers. California’s public 
interest exemption to the right of mandamus suggests one 
potential means by which critical public resources may be 
guarded in cases where “special harm” has not occurred and 
therefore cannot be pleaded. In light of the judiciary’s awareness 
surrounding Society of Plastics’ harmful grip on environmental 
litigation, the judiciary can certainly call upon precedent, policy, 
common sense, and a tragically lengthening list of unconsidered 
environmental destruction to overturn Society of Plastics and 
restore SEQRA’s lost promise to New Yorkers’ reality. 
 
VI. POTENTIAL LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK STATE 
If New York’s courts demur from toppling Society of Plastics’ 
reign over SEQRA, there exist plenty of admirable models on 
which the New York State Legislature can base a new citizen suit 
 
to challenges to governmental action and inaction . . . . The argument that 
individual petitioners did not allege a special, individualized harm, different 
from that of the public at large, is misplaced.”). 
 212. In Application of Committee to Preserve Brighton Beach & Manhattan 
Beach, the court overturned the IAS court and found that the petitioners had 
standing when they alleged construction of a concession stand in a park would 
“interfere with their use and enjoyment of the park, reduce the area of open 
space in the park, cause noise and traffic problems, cause contaminants to be 
released into the air and obstruct their views of the park from their building.”  
Application of Comm. to Pres. Brighton Beach & Manhattan Beach v. Planning 
Comm’n, 695 N.Y.S.2d 7, 11 (App. Div. 1999). In determining that the 
petitioners established “close proximity” to the site of the planned concession 
stand, the court made no mention of Society of Plastics. Id. The court backed up 
its claim by repeating a telling assertion from, of all cases, Sun-Brite: “Standing 
principles,  which are in the end  matters of policy, should  not be heavy-handed 
. . . it is desirable that land use disputes be resolved on their own merits rather 
than by preclusive, restrictive standing rules.”  Id. at 12 (quoting Sun-Brite Car 
Wash, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 508 N.E.2d 130, 133 (N.Y. 1987)). Again, 
a New York court's understanding of policy objectives seems at odds with Society 
of Plastics, especially its special harm requirement. 
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provision for SEQRA.213  Michigan offers the most promising 
example. Not only has MEPA proved to be successful in Michigan, 
but it has also been considered a worthy template for other states 
seeking to protect environmental interests through adoption of a 
citizen suit provision.214  A citizen suit in New York should not 
demand citizen participation in earlier administrative 
procedures, but at the same time should adopt practical 
restrictions on lawsuits for the purpose of maintaining judicial 
efficiency. New York’s citizen suit provision would offer judicial 
review through an Article 78 proceeding. The provision would 
explicitly set forth the citizen petitioner’s right to protect the 
environmental resources of New York while expanding potential 
targets from government actors and corporations215 to other 
private parties, thereby more fully embracing the range of 
environmentally-harmful actors. The potential language of such a 
citizen suit provision might read as follows: 
(1) Any person may maintain an action in the Supreme Court 
having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is 
likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any 
person for the protection of the environment. 
(2) For purposes of this section, “environment” is defined by § 8-
0105 (State Environmental Quality Review Act).216 
 
 213. The New York State Assembly has previously expressed its discomfort 
with the Society of Plastics test through passing two bills, the Environmental 
Access to Justice Act and the Private Environmental Law Enforcement Act. The 
Environmental Access to Justice Act specifically addressed Society of Plastics by 
removing the special harm requirement.  Assemb. A03423, 2009 Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2009). The Private Environmental Law Enforcement Act was a more 
expansive solution, setting forth a statutory private cause of action to contest 
government-approved activities harmful to the environment regardless of 
whether or not the challenger suffered special harm. Assemb. A04272, 2009 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009). The Senate, however, has hitherto declined to 
take up the Assembly bills. 
 214. See supra pp. 13-33. 
 215. See Weidenfeld v. Keppler, 82 N.Y.S. 634, 635-36 (App. Div. 1903). A 
corporation is currently considered a quasi-governmental body for purposes of 
Article 78 party status because it relies on the state for its charter. See id. at 
635-36. 
 216. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 2013) (“‘Environment’ 
means the physical conditions which will be affected by a proposed action, 
including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or 
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(3) For purposes of this section, a “person” shall include any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, government 
entity, or other legal entity whose interests fall within the stated 
purposes of § 8-0101 and whose stated injury harms those 
interests. 
(4) As a condition precedent to the institution of an action 
pursuant to paragraph (1), the complaining party shall first file 
with the governmental agencies or authorities charged by law 
with the duty of regulating or prohibiting the act or conduct 
complained of a verified complaint setting forth the facts upon 
which the complaint is based and the manner in which the 
complaining party is affected. Upon receipt of a complaint, the 
governmental agency or authority shall forthwith transmit, by 
registered or certified mail, a copy of such complaint to those 
parties charged with violating the laws, rules, and regulations for 
the environment. The agency receiving such complaint shall have 
30 days after the receipt thereof within which to take appropriate 
action. If such action is not taken within the time prescribed, the 
complaining party may institute the judicial proceedings 
authorized in paragraph (1). However, failure to comply with this 
subsection shall not bar an action for a temporary restraining 
order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm from the 
conduct or activity complained of. 
(5) Paragraph (4) shall not apply if the act or conduct complained 
of is not subject to regulation or prohibition by a government 
agency or authority. 
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) borrow MEPA’s language217 while 
inserting the zone of interests protected by SEQRA. Paragraph 
(4) borrows Florida’s limitations on the citizen suit.218  De 
minimis environmental damage will be deemed insufficient as a 
qualifying injury through the discretion of courts. 
Pennsylvania219 and Minnesota220 have both demonstrated that 
 
aesthetic significance, existing patterns of population concentration, 
distribution, or growth, and existing community or neighborhood character.”). 
 217. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701  (2011). 
 218. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (2014). 
 219. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Gettysburg Battlefield 
Tower, the Attorney General, through invoking the environmental right 
contained in Pennsylvania’s constitution, sought to enjoin the construction of an 
observation tower on Gettysburg Battlefield. Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg 
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courts can distinguish actionable damage from de minimis 
damage even in a setting where standing requirements are 
relaxed to protect the environment. It is worth noting that under 
the proposed citizen suit provision environmental non-profits will 
have standing to bring suit under the proposed language so long 
as they can prove that their interests fall within that of SEQRA 
and they allege injures to those interests. Gone is the 
unreasonable necessity of proving an individual member of the 
organization suffers special harm. 
 Whether through judicial reform or legislative action, the 
writing is on the wall for environmental standing in New York 
State. Considering more effective rules in other states, insights of 
New York courts, and perverse holdings that contradict the 
purposes of SEQRA, it is plain that New York deserves more 
reasonable standing requirements and is perfectly capable of 
delivering such reform to its people. 
 
 
Battlefield Tower, 302 A.2d 886, 887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). The court 
cautioned that: 
It is difficult to conceive of any human activity that does not in some 
degree impair the natural, scenic and esthetic values of any 
environment. If the standard of injury to historic values is to be that 
expressed by the Commonwealth's witnesses as an “intrusion” or 
“distraction,” it becomes difficult to imagine any activity in the 
vicinity of Gettysburg which would not unconstitutionally harm its 
historic values. This, of course, indicates why elements of State 
government other than the judiciary should, as by Article I, Section 
27 [the constitutional environmental right] they are empowered to 
do, establish reasonable regulations for the preservation, 
conservation and maintenance of the peoples' resources. 
Id. at 895. Though the court found that the Attorney General had standing, the 
validity of administrative discretion was recognized. Id. at 893-94. 
 220. See supra pp. 22-25. 
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